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I. Introduction 
Income from employment (FICA)1 and self-employment 
(SECA)2 taxes represents more than one-third of annual federal 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA), I.R.C. §§ 3101–3128 
(2012) (describing employment taxes (sometimes called “payroll taxes”), which 
are paid by employers and employees based on employees’ wages).  
 2. See Self-Employment Contributions Act (SECA), I.R.C. §§ 1401–1403 
(2012) (describing self-employment taxes, which are paid by self-employed 
individuals on their net income from self-employment).  
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revenue.3 Likewise, Social Security and Medicare—the social 
insurance programs that these taxes support—account for more 
than one-third of all federal government spending each year.4 The 
government expects Medicare and Social Security expenditures to 
rise at an accelerated clip in the coming decades due to 
demographic changes and increasing health care costs.5 
Expenditures on these programs already exceed annual revenue 
from employment and self-employment taxes,6 and the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that the deficits will 
worsen.7 While our country undoubtedly needs broader policy 
changes to address those deficits, there is no reason to neglect 
opportunities to maximize employment and self-employment tax 
revenues by effectively enforcing existing tax law until those 
changes arrive.  
Because the employment tax regime targets wages arising 
from formal employer–employee relationships and utilizes a 
                                                                                                     
 3. See Tax Policy Ctr. (Urban Inst. & Brookings Inst.), TPC Tax Topics: 
Payroll Taxes, TAX POL’Y CENTER, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxtopics/ 
Payroll-Taxes.cfm (last visited Sept. 15, 2013) (noting that FICA and SECA 
taxes accounted for 34.5% of all federal revenue in 2012) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). FICA taxes produce the vast majority of this 
revenue, generating more than 30% of federal revenue in 2011 compared with 
approximately 2% from SECA taxes. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 4168, THE 
TAXATION OF CAPITAL AND LABOR THROUGH THE SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAX 1 (2012) 
[hereinafter CBO SECA REPORT]. This ratio “closely reflects” the ratio of wage 
earners to self-employed individuals. Id. 
 4. See CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: WHERE DO 
OUR FEDERAL TAX DOLLARS GO? 1 (2013), http://www.cbpp.org/files/4-14-
08tax.pdf (providing spending figures for fiscal year 2012).  
 5. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 4507, THE 2012 LONG-TERM BUDGET 
OUTLOOK 12–13, 45, 65 (2012) (projecting increases in expenditures due to rising 
health care costs and increases in the number of beneficiaries as baby boomers 
age). 
 6. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 4520, THE 2012 LONG-TERM 
PROJECTIONS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 1 (2012) (“In 2011, 
[Social Security] outlays exceeded tax revenues by 4 percent, and CBO projects 
that the gap will average about 10 percent of tax revenues over the next 
decade.”). 
 7. See Soc. Sec. & Medicare Bds. of Trs., A Summary of the 2013 Annual 
Reports, U.S. SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/oact/trsum/index.html 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2013) (reporting revenues and expenditures for Social 
Security and Medicare in recent years and projecting deficits over the next 
several decades) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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structured, uniform withholding system, it is easier to enforce.8 
Because the self-employment tax regime operates outside of a 
formal wage system, its tax base is more porous. That is, 
characterization of income may allow taxpayers to shield the 
return on self-employed labor from the SECA base.9 The CBO 
estimates that the self-employment tax base captures 
approximately three-fourths of the income that would be taxed if 
those workers were subject to the FICA tax regime.10 
Income generated through partnerships and other 
unincorporated business entities such as limited liability 
companies (LLCs) and limited liability partnerships (LLPs) 
presents particular self-employment tax enforcement challenges. 
Because Congress and the Treasury Department have failed to 
update certain tax laws and regulations to address the evolution 
of the unincorporated business entity landscape over the past 
three decades, income that arguably should be part of the self-
employment tax base eludes taxation.11 Service-providing 
professionals such as lawyers, doctors, and accountants, who 
often organize their businesses as unincorporated entities, can 
exploit these rules, essentially permitting those taxpayers to elect 
out of the self-employment tax regime through choice of entity 
and ownership structure.12  
                                                                                                     
 8. See Patricia E. Dilley, Breaking the Glass Slipper—Reflections on the 
Self-Employment Tax, 54 TAX LAW. 65, 93–96 (2000) (comparing the 
employment and self-employment tax systems and noting differences that make 
employment taxes easier to collect). 
 9. See id. at 96 (noting that the taxpayer alone controls classification of 
income as subject to self-employment tax, which creates a “greater potential” for 
understatement of self-employment income and underpayment of self-
employment taxes); see also Richard Winchester, The Gap in the Employment 
Tax Gap, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 127, 127 (2009) (noting that the law permits 
individuals who conduct their business through an unincorporated entity to 
“artificially exclude from the employment tax base amounts that would 
otherwise be included if they operated as a sole proprietor”).  
 10. CBO SECA REPORT, supra note 3, at iv.  
 11. See infra Part III (explaining how the self-employment tax base fails to 
capture all labor income due to the nature of unincorporated businesses); infra 
Part IV.E (describing the problems presented by the changes to the 
unincorporated business landscape). 
 12. See CBO SECA REPORT, supra note 3, at 2 (describing how differences 
in the FICA and SECA tax regimes can “affect an individual’s decision about 
whether to be self-employed” and “influence the choice of how to organize a 
firm”); see also Winchester, supra note 9, at 128 (“Depending on the business 
LIMITED PARTNER EXCLUSION 2393 
Internal Revenue Code § 1402(a)(13),13 which excludes from 
the self-employment tax base the distributive share of any 
“limited partner” (less guaranteed payments for services 
rendered),14 represents one such loophole-creating rule and is the 
focus of this Note. Some unincorporated business owners now 
exploit the limited partner exclusion—originally enacted to 
prevent taxpayers from obtaining Social Security benefits 
improperly by paying self-employment taxes15—to avoid paying 
the tax.16 Neither the Internal Revenue Code nor the Treasury 
Regulations define “limited partner” or provide guidance on how 
to apply this provision to modern unincorporated businesses that 
no longer neatly fit within the 1977 limited partnership 
framework.17 
Part II of this Note lays the foundation for analyzing this 
problem by discussing the history of Social Security and Medicare 
and of the employment and self-employment tax regimes.18 This 
Part also discusses how the legislative history of the Social 
Security Act of 193519 reveals several policy choices that have 
shaped the development of both the Social Security program and 
the tax regimes that finance it.20 Part III explains why one of 
these policy choices—the decision to fund Social Security through 
                                                                                                     
entity that she uses, a self-employed individual can substantially reduce her 
employment tax liability and often eliminate it entirely.”). 
 13. I.R.C. § 1402(a)(13) (2012). 
 14. See id. (“[T]here shall be excluded the distributive share of any item of 
income or loss of a limited partner . . . other than guaranteed payments . . . to 
that partner for services actually rendered to or on behalf of the partnership to 
the extent that those payments are . . . remuneration for those services.”). 
 15. See infra notes 134–36 and accompanying text (explaining Congress’s 
motivation to enact the limited partner exclusion). 
 16. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PUB. NO. JCS-02-05, OPTIONS TO IMPROVE 
TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 98–99 (2005) (“The 
uncertainty in treatment creates an opportunity for abuse by taxpayers willing 
to make the argument that they are not subject to any employment tax (FICA or 
self-employment), even though this argument is contrary to the spirit and intent 
of the employment tax rules.”). 
 17. Infra note 153 and accompanying text.  
 18. Infra Part II. 
 19. Social Security Act (Old Age Pension Act), Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 
620 (1935) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 20. Infra Part II.A.  
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a contributory tax on labor income—presents special challenges 
in the unincorporated business context.21  
Part IV discusses the limited partner exclusion, explaining 
both the impetus for its enactment and Congress’s rationale for 
using limited partners as a dividing line to separate labor income 
and capital income.22 This Part also puts § 1402(a)(13) in context 
by describing the unincorporated business landscape as Congress 
viewed it in 1977 and chronicling the ways the business 
landscape has changed.23 These changes, especially the 
proliferation of LLCs (whose owners are neither “general 
partners” nor “limited partners” under state law), have created 
uncertainty for taxpayers and produced numerous problems 
applying the exclusion.24 This Part also describes the Internal 
Revenue Service’s (IRS) mechanical interpretation of 
§ 1402(a)(13)—affirmed by courts through the years—that 
classification as a “general partner” or “limited partner” for 
§ 1402(a)(13) purposes depends only on one’s classification under 
state law.25  
Part V focuses on the IRS’s attempts to address these 
problems by proposing regulations in the mid-1990s26 and 
explains how Congress eventually thwarted these problem-
solving attempts by enacting a regulatory moratorium in 1997.27  
Part VI discusses the 2011 Tax Court case of Renkemeyer, 
Campbell & Weaver, LLP v. Commissioner,28 which exemplifies 
the potential for abuse created by the lack of definitive guidance 
on how to apply the limited partner exclusion to unincorporated 
business entities other than limited partnerships.29 Renkemeyer 
                                                                                                     
 21. See infra Part III (discussing difficulties in separating labor income and 
capital income). 
 22. Infra Part IV.A–B. 
 23. See infra Part IV.B (describing the business landscape in 1977); infra 
Part IV.D (describing the evolution of unincorporated business entities since 
1977). 
 24. See infra Part IV.E (describing these problems). 
 25. See infra Part IV.C (discussing cases decided using this standard). 
 26. Infra Part V.A–B. 
 27. Infra Part V.C. 
 28. 136 T.C. 137 (2011). 
 29. Infra Part VI.A (explaining the taxpayer’s aggressive position and the 
Tax Court’s response).  
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garnered attention from tax practitioners—not so much for its 
result, but rather for the Tax Court’s reasoning in reaching the 
result.30 The court gave little weight to precedent that would have 
easily decided the case and instead focused on the partners’ level 
of participation to determine whether they qualified as limited 
partners.31 The court’s rationale left practitioners wondering if 
material participation is the new dividing line—one that may 
jeopardize the ability of some state-law-designated limited 
partners to utilize the exclusion.32  
In Part VII, this Note advocates for adoption of a material 
participation standard to interpret the limited partner exclusion, 
noting the limitations of this approach.33 Part VIII concludes this 
Note by discussing possible mechanisms for adopting such a 
standard.34 
II. Historical Foundations of the Self-Employment Tax  
A. Landmark Legislation: Social Security Act of 1935 
To appreciate the current dilemma regarding exclusion or 
inclusion of income for self-employment tax purposes, it is helpful 
to understand the basic history of the social insurance programs 
funded by employment and self-employment tax revenue. FICA 
and SECA taxes provide the majority of funding for three 
programs: (1) the Old Age and Survivors’ Insurance program, 
which provides cash benefits to retired workers and surviving 
dependents of deceased workers; (2) the Disability Insurance 
program, which provides cash benefits to disabled workers and 
their dependents; and (3) Hospital Insurance, which funds health 
insurance benefits popularly known as Medicare.35  
                                                                                                     
 30. See infra Part VI.B (describing reactions to Renkemeyer). 
 31. See infra notes 289–301 and accompanying text (describing the court’s 
analysis). 
 32. See infra notes 309–10 and accompanying text (describing this 
concern). 
 33. Infra Part VII. 
 34. Infra Part VIII. 
 35. Dilley, supra note 8, at 65 & n.2, 69. 
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Responding to growing concern about income insecurity 
following the Great Depression,36 Congress enacted the Social 
Security Act37 in 1935, which established Social Security, the 
cash benefits program for retired workers.38 Social Security was 
not the first federal program to provide direct assistance to 
citizens and their families,39 but it was the first program to utilize 
a social insurance approach.40 Rather than obtaining benefit 
eligibility by demonstrating financial need, individuals gained 
eligibility for Social Security (and later, Medicare) benefits by 
working in employment covered by the Social Security Act41 and 
by making contributions to the Social Security program.42 Cash 
benefit amounts are not formally means-tested;43 instead the 
                                                                                                     
 36. See Lawrence H. Thompson & Melinda M. Upp, The Social Insurance 
Approach and Social Security, in SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 3, 3–4 
(Eric R. Kingson & James H. Schulz eds. 1997) (explaining the need for Social 
Security). 
 37. Social Security Act (Old Age Pension Act), Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 
620 (1935) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Although the 
Act passed in 1935, the government did not begin collecting payroll taxes until 
1937 and did not begin disbursing benefits until 1942. Martha A. McSteen, Fifty 
Years of Social Security, U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN. SOC. SECURITY HIST., 
http://www.ssa.gov/history/50mm2.html (last visited Nov, 4, 2013) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 38. See 49 Stat. at 620 (describing the Act’s purposes, including “[t]o 
provide for the general welfare by establishing a system of Federal old-age 
benefits”); see also DENNIS W. JOHNSON, THE LAWS THAT SHAPED AMERICA: 
FIFTEEN ACTS OF CONGRESS AND THEIR LASTING IMPACT 176–77 (2009) (describing 
the components of the Social Security Act of 1935). 
 39. See JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 178 (describing the public’s familiarity 
with federal assistance programs). 
 40. See Thompson & Upp, supra note 36, at 4–6 (providing historical 
context to Congress’s choice to build Social Security on a social insurance 
model). 
 41. See 42 U.S.C. § 414(a)(2) (2012) (stating that forty quarters of 
qualifying work establishes basic eligibility for lifetime benefits). For a quarter 
to qualify, the worker must earn a certain amount, set by the government each 
year, based on average total covered wages. Id. § 413(d)(2). For the 2013 tax 
year, a worker who earns $1,160 in one quarter receives one credit. SOC. SEC. 
ADMIN., FACT SHEET: 2013 SOCIAL SECURITY CHANGES 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/pressoffice/factsheets/colafacts2013.htm. 
 42. See Thompson & Upp, supra note 36, at 7 (“Eligibility for benefits 
under social insurance programs [such as Social Security] rests, in part, on 
current or previous contributions by the individual, the individual’s employer, or 
both.”). 
 43. See id. at 10 (explaining that means-tested programs such as food 
stamps and Medicaid pay benefits “to claimants who first demonstrate limited 
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program calculates benefit amounts using a percentage of a 
worker’s lifetime average earnings.44 This structure—tying work 
to benefits—distinguished Social Security from other social 
programs.  
Although Social Security initially covered only workers in 
“commerce and industry,” which included approximately 60% of 
jobs at that time,45 President Franklin D. Roosevelt favored 
including all Americans in the program from the start.46 Aside 
from his desire to protect all Americans from the dangers of 
income insecurity, President Roosevelt recognized that without 
compulsory, universal participation and coverage, the program 
would not be able to generate enough revenue to cover its 
obligations.47 
Working toward this universal coverage goal, Social Security 
coverage expanded over the next two decades, adding survivors of 
deceased workers,48 previously excluded wage-earning workers,49 
                                                                                                     
economic resources” and typically have “nothing to do with prior earnings or 
payment of taxes”). Social Security benefits are, however, indirectly means-
tested in that only a portion of higher income individuals’ benefits are excluded 
from gross income. See I.R.C. § 86 (2012) (describing taxation of Social Security 
benefits). Through the income tax, higher income beneficiaries return a portion 
of their benefits to the government. 
 44. See 42 U.S.C. § 415 (providing the benefit determination formula). The 
benefit determination formula, however, is “weighted to provide a higher level of 
replacement of prior earnings for low earners.” Dilley, supra note 8, at 69 n.15. 
Although Medicare eligibility also requires forty quarters of qualifying 
employment, medical costs—not prior earnings—determine Medicare benefit 
amounts. See id. (noting this difference). 
 45. LARRY W. DEWITT, DANIEL BÉLAND & EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ, SOCIAL 
SECURITY: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 4 (2008). 
 46. See JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 183 (noting a statement made by 
President Roosevelt in a cabinet meeting during the early stages of planning the 
new program that would become Social Security).  
 47. See Eric R. Kingson & James H. Schulz, Should Social Security be 
Means-Tested?, in SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 36, at 41, 
43–44 (describing problems that would result if taxpayers could “opt-out” of the 
Social Security program). 
 48. See Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379, 53 
Stat. 1360 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1306–1307 (2012)) (adding survivor 
benefits). 
 49. See Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-734, 64 
Stat. 477 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 411–418, 1308, 1351–1355 (2012)) (expanding 
coverage to wage-earning farm and domestic workers and some federal 
government workers). 
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disabled citizens who could not work,50 and the self-employed.51 
Congress introduced the Hospital Insurance (HI) program in 
1964.52 
B. Funding Social Security: Affirming the Tie Between Benefits 
and Labor 
Like the universal coverage goal, the commitment to tying 
benefits to a person’s work played a vital role in Social Security’s 
creation and still drives the program’s financing structure today. 
In discussions leading to the Social Security Act’s enactment, 
President Roosevelt emphasized that Social Security should be a 
form of social insurance, not welfare, as “[w]elfare, then and now, 
carried negative connotations; insurance did not.”53 He noted that 
“[u]nder an insurance program, work and savings are 
encouraged, and individuals would not be on the dreaded ‘dole.’”54 
J. Douglas Brown, a Princeton University professor who chaired 
the first Advisory Council on Social Security (assembled by 
President Roosevelt to design Social Security),55 found it both 
“politically and psychologically reasonable” to limit eligibility for 
benefits to workers who contributed into the system.56 The 
benefits–labor connection, Brown said, gave contributing workers 
“a broad equity in a system—a sense of right—that for the 
                                                                                                     
 50. See Social Security Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-880, 70 Stat. 
807 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (adding disability 
benefits); see also JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 177 (“In 1956, Congress 
incorporated disability insurance and later created SSI, the Supplemental 
Security Income program for the indigent aged not eligible for regular Social 
Security benefits.”). 
 51. See Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-734, 64 
Stat. 477 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 411–418, 1308, 1351–1355 (2012)) (extending 
coverage to nonfarm, nonprofessional, self-employed individuals); Social 
Security Amendments of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-761, 68 Stat. 1052 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 176, 420–422 (2012)) (extending coverage to self-employed farmers 
and most self-employed professionals). 
 52. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 
286 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (adding Medicare). 
 53. JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 184. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See J. DOUGLAS BROWN, ESSAYS ON SOCIAL SECURITY viii (1977) 
(describing his service on the Advisory Council). 
 56. Id. at 26.  
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contributor distinguished benefits from relief.”57 Affirming 
President Roosevelt’s thinking, Brown agreed that a social 
insurance program based on work would earn greater popular 
and political appeal than a welfare system because it was 
“individualized” and “suited the American mores of paying for 
one’s own ticket.”58 
Believing it wrong to “saddle future generations with 
expenditures accrued in the 1940s,” President Roosevelt 
demanded that Social Security be entirely self-financing and 
favored a payroll tax on wages over general revenues.59 Congress 
ultimately sided with President Roosevelt and chose a payroll tax 
on wages over an increase in the general income tax for several 
reasons. First, payroll taxes would supply a revenue source 
independent of income and other taxes.60 Next, Congress viewed 
the general income tax as an “uncertain means of collecting 
money for social projects.”61 At the time, the income tax had a 
narrow base—95% of Americans paid no income taxes—which 
limited its expansion potential and made it “unreliable” for 
covering Social Security’s future obligations.62 Most important, a 
wage tax reinforced the program’s labor–benefits link. 
Social Security’s architects believed that financing the 
program through a payroll tax had political as well as practical 
expediency in that workers would “enthusiastically buy into the 
idea that it was their money that went in and their money that 
would be available at retirement time.”63 Further, as President 
Roosevelt put it, a wage tax would “give the contributors a legal, 
                                                                                                     
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. DEWITT ET AL., supra note 45, at 3; see also SHEILA BURKE, ERIC KINGSON 
& UWE REINHARDT, SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE: INDIVIDUAL VS. COLLECTIVE 
RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY 38 (2000) (“The self-financing feature of the program, 
first proposed by Franklin Roosevelt in 1935, became another of its celebrated 
virtues.”). 
 60. See Edward D. Berkowitz, The Historical Development of Social 
Security in the United States, in SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra 
note 36, at 22, 24  (noting this characteristic). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 186. Note that an individual’s earnings 
recorded—not taxes paid—determine Social Security benefit amounts. See 42 
U.S.C. § 415 (2012) (providing the formulas for computing benefit amounts). 
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moral, and political right to collect their pensions,” having 
already paid taxes into the system.64 This right would safeguard 
the benefits from any future politicians’ attempts to scrap Social 
Security.65 
 The Federal Insurance Contributions Act66 authorized the 
payroll tax, splitting the nominal tax liability evenly between 
employers and employees.67 The wage tax provided an easy way 
to identify labor income because wages represent labor “being 
exchanged in an employer-employee setting.”68 Likewise, the 
payroll tax withholding system made eligibility and benefit 
record keeping administratively convenient69 and made the tax 
“relatively easy to implement and enforce.”70  
Incorporating self-employed individuals into Social Security 
required a new taxation system because self-employed people, by 
definition, did not receive wages or have an employer with whom 
to share contribution responsibilities.71 Further, covering the self-
employed presented administrative difficulties because the FICA 
withholding system could not be replicated in the self-
employment context.72 Additionally, self-employed earnings did 
not have the same “labor income only” quality as wages.73 Despite 
these differences, Congress desired “[t]o place the self-employed 
on a comparable basis with wage earners,”74 meaning that the 
                                                                                                     
 64. JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 186.  
 65. See id. (quoting President Roosevelt as saying, “With those taxes in 
there, no damn politician can ever scrap my social security program”).  
 66. I.R.C. §§ 3101–3128 (2012). 
 67. See id. § 3101 (employee portion); id. § 3111 (employer portion). 
 68. Dilley, supra note 8, at 71. 
 69. See id. at 93–94 (describing the FICA system’s convenience as both a 
revenue-collection and benefit-accrual device). Note that employers—not 
employees—collect FICA taxes and pay them to the government. See I.R.C. 
§ 3102(a) (“The tax . . . shall be collected by the employer of the taxpayer, by 
deducting the amount of the tax from the wages as and when paid.”). 
 70. Dilley, supra note 8, at 71. 
 71. See id. at 74 (describing reasons why Congress could not simply 
incorporate self-employed individuals into the FICA system). 
 72. See id. at 94 (“The convenience of the payroll tax withholding system is 
replaced by the difficulties of assessing a wage tax where there is no payroll.”). 
 73.  See infra notes 117–25 and accompanying text (explaining how the 
self-employment tax base captures both labor income and returns on capital). 
 74. S. REP. NO. 81-1669, at 3318 (1950). 
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self-employment tax system would share the FICA system’s goal 
of taxing compensation for labor.75  
Instinctively, Congress attempted to replicate the FICA tax 
model in the self-employment realm. This effort produced the 
self-employment tax—an income tax that Congress hoped would 
behave like a wage tax.76 Section 1401 of the Internal Revenue 
Code77 states that taxes “shall be imposed for each taxable year, 
on the self-employment income of every individual.”78 The Code 
imposes self-employment taxes only on “net earnings from self-
employment,”79 which § 1402 defines as  
the gross income derived by an individual from any trade or 
business carried on by such individual, less the deductions 
allowed . . . which are attributable to such trade or business, 
plus his distributive share (whether or not distributed) of 
income or loss . . . from any trade or business carried on by a 
partnership of which he is a member.80 
The section excludes several income categories from net earnings 
from self-employment, including: net income from rental 
properties (except for real estate dealers);81 dividend and interest 
income (except for securities dealers);82 and gains or losses from 
the sale or exchange of capital assets.83 Because Congress wanted 
the self-employment tax base to parallel the FICA system’s labor 
income base, Congress excluded these archetypal categories of 
capital income from the start.84  
                                                                                                     
 75. See Dilley, supra note 8, at 74 (“Nonetheless, Congress determined that 
the self-employed must be taxed on a basis comparable to that of employers and 
employees—that is, ‘on remuneration received for one’s own labor.’”). 
 76. See id. at 93 (characterizing the self-employment tax as an income tax 
that “is required to perform like a wage tax”). 
 77. I.R.C. § 1401 (2012).  
 78. Id. 
 79. See CBO SECA REPORT, supra note 3, at 1 (“[T]he SECA tax base is the 
net business income (that is, receipts minus expenses) for self-employed 
workers.”).  
 80. I.R.C. § 1402(a).  
 81. Id. § 1402(a)(1). 
 82. Id. § 1402(a)(2). 
 83. Id. § 1402(a)(3)(A)–(C). 
 84. See Dilley, supra note 8, at 78 (“Given the policy requirement that 
Social Security taxes be imposed generally on earnings from labor, as opposed to 
investment income, dividends and interest income are predictably excluded . . . 
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The first self-employment tax applied a 2.25% tax to a 
taxpayer’s net income from self-employment.85 This rate 
represented the full employee’s share of the FICA tax at the time 
(1.5%) plus an estimate of the after-tax employer’s share 
(0.75%).86 Self-employed individuals paid the tax through their 
income tax returns and could not deduct any portion of the self-
employment taxes they paid.87 
C. Current Structure of Social Insurance Financing 
The self-employment tax’s structure evolved over the next 
thirty years, becoming more parallel to the FICA tax regime. 
Today, self-employed individuals pay a 15.3% SECA tax, equaling 
both the employer and employee portions of the FICA tax.88 
Section 164(f)89 permits self-employed individuals to deduct one-
half of their self-employment tax liability as a business expense 
(just as the employer’s portion of the FICA tax is not included in 
an employee’s gross income).90 To achieve full parity with the 
FICA system, self-employed taxpayers may reduce their self-
employment tax base by an amount equivalent to one-half of their 
self-employment tax liability before computing the § 164(f) 
deduction.91 
                                                                                                     
as such income is not analogous to employee wages.”). 
 85. Berkowitz, supra note 60, at 25. 
 86. See Dilley, supra note 8, at 74 (noting that Congress intended this 
percentage to “represent the full employee’s share plus a rough estimate of the 
after-tax employer’s share of the tax”). 
 87. Id. 
 88. See I.R.C. § 1401(a)–(b) (2012) (providing the SECA rate and describing 
how it is allocated); see also Dilley, supra note 8, at 74–75 (explaining that 
Congress revised the SECA tax structure to “require self-employed persons to 
pay, in effect, ‘both halves’ of the employer and employee shares of Social 
Security taxes”). 
 89. I.R.C. § 164(f).  
 90. See id. (providing for the deduction); see also Dilley, supra note 8, at 
75–76 (explaining the need for the § 164(f) and § 1402(a)(12) deductions given 
Congress’s goal of putting the self-employed worker “in roughly the same 
position as an employee after income and FICA taxes are imposed on wage 
income” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-47, at 126 (1983) (Conf. Rep))). 
 91. See I.R.C. § 1402(a)(12) (providing for this deduction).  
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The 15.3% tax rate allocates 12.4% to the Old Age, Survivors, 
and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program and 2.9% to the HI 
program.92 The tax’s OASDI part applies only to a portion of an 
individual’s income that is capped by statute each year and 
adjusted for average wage growth.93 In 2013, the OASDI tax 
applied only to the first $113,700 in net earnings from self-
employment.94  
The HI portion originally had a similar earnings ceiling, but 
Congress removed the ceiling in 199395 in response to claims that 
the HI wage ceiling provided an advantage to higher income 
taxpayers. The wage cap allowed higher income taxpayers to 
receive Medicare coverage by contributing a much smaller 
percentage of their overall income than most other workers.96 
Today, the HI tax applies to all net earnings from self-
employment, making self-employment tax liability a more 
significant issue for higher income taxpayers.97 
The Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 201098 
(amended by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act99) 
authorized two new Medicare revenue sources that took effect 
January 1, 2013, and also increased the tax burden for higher 
income taxpayers.100 The first, codified at Internal Revenue Code 
                                                                                                     
 92. Id. § 1401(a)–(b). 
 93. See 42 U.S.C. § 430 (2012) (providing for the adjustment of the OASDI 
wage base); see also CBO SECA REPORT, supra note 3, at 1 (explaining the wage 
cap system).  
 94. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 334, TAX GUIDE FOR SMALL BUSINESSES 4 
(2012), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p334.pdf. 
 95. See Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 
416 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 267a and various sections of 26 U.S.C.) 
(eliminating the HI income ceiling). 
 96. See Dilley, supra note 8, at 80 (describing the rationale behind 
abolishing the HI earnings ceiling). 
 97. See id. at 81 (discussing highly compensated self-employed individuals’ 
increased focus on minimizing income subject to self-employment taxes after 
Congress eliminated the HI wage base).  
 98. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
152, 124 Stat. 1029. 
 99. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010). 
 100. See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029, 1061 (imposing the net investment income tax); Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 1020 
(2010) (providing for the 0.9% surtax on wages and self-employment income for 
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§ 1411,101 imposes a 3.8% income tax on the lesser of: a taxpayer’s 
“net investment income” (NII) or the excess, if any, of the 
taxpayer’s modified adjusted gross income for the taxable year 
over the “threshold amount.”102 Section 1411(b) sets the threshold 
amounts as follows: $250,000 for a married taxpayer filing a joint 
return; $200,000 for a single taxpayer; and $125,000 for a 
married taxpayer filing separately.103 NII generally includes 
income from investments (such as interests and dividends) 
associated with a taxpayer’s nonpassive activities and all income 
from passive activities.104 Section 469105 provides the framework 
for determining whether an activity is passive or nonpassive in 
relation to a taxpayer.106  
NII does not apply to wages or self-employment income. 
Instead, the second new Medicare revenue source—the Medicare 
surtax described in § 3101107—increases the HI tax rate for wages 
and taxable self-employment income above the threshold amount 
from 2.9% to 3.8%.108 The employee (or self-employed taxpayer) 
alone bears this 0.9% surtax.109 
Thus, a single taxpayer having no NII but having taxable 
income of $250,000 from self-employment would pay 2.9% HI tax 
                                                                                                     
higher income earners). 
 101. I.R.C. § 1411 (2012).  
 102. Id. § 1411(a)(1)(A)–(B).  
 103. Id. § 1411(b)(1)–(3).  
 104. See id. § 1411(c)(1)–(2) (explaining the income categories subject to NII 
tax). The Code defines NII as the sum of the following: gross income from 
interest, dividends, annuities, royalties, and rents not derived from a trade or 
business that is passive with respect to the taxpayer; other gross income of any 
kind derived from a passive activity or the trade or business of trading in 
financial instruments or commodities; and net income from the disposition of 
property of a trade or business other than that used in a passive activity trade 
or business, less allowed deductions that are allocated to that those categories of 
gross income or net gain. Id. 
 105. I.R.C. § 469 (2012). 
 106. See infra Part VII.C (describing the tests set forth in § 469 for 
identifying passive and nonpassive income). 
 107. I.R.C. § 3101. 
 108. See id. § 3101(b)(1)–(2) (providing for an additional 0.9% HI tax on 
income over the threshold amount, increasing the HI tax rate on this income 
from 2.9% to 3.8%).  
 109. See id. §§ 3101–3102 (increasing only the “employee share” of the HI 
tax). 
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on the first $200,000 and 3.8% HI tax on the remaining $50,000. 
If the same taxpayer instead had $180,000 of taxable self-
employment income and $70,000 of NII, she would pay 2.9% HI 
tax on the self-employment income portion ($180,000) and 3.8% 
NII tax on $50,000 of her NII. A single taxpayer with $250,000 of 
taxable self-employment income and $100,000 of NII would pay 
2.9% HI tax on the first $200,000 of self-employment income, 
3.8% HI tax on the remaining self-employment income ($50,000), 
and 3.8% NII tax on all of NII ($100,000). In tandem, the 
Medicare surtax and new NII tax operate to close some of the 
revenue gap left by the current employment and self-employment 
tax regimes. 
III. Excluding Returns on Capital from the SECA Tax Base 
Although the self-employment tax regime aims to include 
income from labor in its tax base and exclude income from 
capital, achieving this goal is not easy. While some businesses—a 
babysitting service, for example—can produce income from labor 
alone, many businesses subject to self-employment taxes 
generate income using both labor and capital investments.110 For 
these businesses, accurately identifying and separating income 
derived from capital and income derived from labor with precision 
is difficult, if not impossible.111 
Consider a landscaping business operated as a sole 
proprietorship. To generate revenue, the business requires both 
the owner’s investment in tangible capital assets—equipment 
such as mowers, tools, perhaps a truck and trailer—and the 
owner’s personal labor.112 Likewise, as the landscaping business 
gains a positive reputation, the owner can reasonably attribute 
some income to goodwill and going concern value113—intangible 
capital assets.  
                                                                                                     
 110. Cf. CBO SECA REPORT, supra note 3, at 1–2 (explaining that the self-
employment tax base captures some income that represents a return on capital). 
 111. See JANE G. GRAVELLE, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TAXING CAPITAL 
INCOME 49 (1994) (calling it “extremely difficult—indeed, probably impossible—
to separate capital income from labor income for closely held businesses where 
the owner may supply both capital and labor services”). 
 112. See id. at 11 (“Income is the sum of wage income and capital income.”).  
 113. See Treas. Reg. § 1.197-2(b)(1) (defining “goodwill” as “the value of a 
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Thus, the owner can appropriately characterize some portion 
of the business’s income as a return on her investment in those 
capital assets. This return on capital is little different from a gain 
realized on appreciated real estate or interest income from a 
bond. Asking the landscape company owner to designate portions 
of each dollar earned as income derived from the business’s 
capital assets or income derived from labor, however, would be 
both administratively onerous and imprecise.114  
Therefore, the self-employment tax regime includes all net 
income from self-employment in the tax base unless a delineated 
exception excludes it.115 Despite the Internal Revenue Code’s 
exclusion of several capital income categories, the inclusion 
presumption inevitably subjects some income from capital to self-
employment tax.116 
In a September 2012 report, the CBO attempted to divide the 
self-employment tax base into its capital and labor components 
and examined various proposals to better isolate labor income in 
the tax base.117 Focusing on the self-employment Hospital 
Insurance (SECA-HI) tax base (because it is not subject to an 
income ceiling118), the CBO estimated that approximately 40% of 
                                                                                                     
trade or business attributable to the expectancy of continued customer 
patronage,” noting that “[t]his expectancy may be due to the name or reputation 
of a trade or business or any other factor”); see also id. §1.197-2(b)(2) (describing 
“going concern value” as “the additional value that attaches to property by 
reason of its existence as an integral part of an ongoing business activity”). 
 114. Suppose the landscaper spends eight hours mowing a twenty-acre lot 
using a riding lawn mower and earns $160. How much should the landscaper 
attribute to the lawn mower—the capital asset—and how much should she 
attribute to her skill and labor in operating it? One could argue that had the 
landscaper invested in a walk-behind lawnmower rather than the riding mower, 
the prospective customer may never have even considered her bid. This scenario 
supports a claim that capital generated a larger portion of the income. 
Regardless, this type of analysis with respect to business transactions is 
generally impracticable.  
 115. See I.R.C. § 1402(a) (2012) (defining net income from self-employment 
as all self-employment income except income from categories designated in 
§ 1402(a)(1)–(17)); see also Dilley, supra note 8, at 97 (explaining the SECA tax 
regime’s “inclusionary” approach). 
 116. See CBO SECA REPORT, supra note 3, at 1–2 (noting that although 
Congress intended to tax the self-employed solely on remuneration for labor, the 
self-employment tax base “[does] not conform to that intent”). 
 117. See generally CBO SECA REPORT, supra note 3. 
 118. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (describing the HI wage 
ceiling’s history). 
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the base derives from capital.119 Overall, 65% of capital income is 
subject to self-employment taxes120 but more than half of labor 
income—defined as the portion of a self-employed person’s income 
that would be subject to FICA tax if the person were employed by 
a corporation—is excluded from the SECA-HI tax base.121 
The report explains that this distortion occurs because of the 
self-employment tax base’s sensitivity to profitability. “[W]hen 
net income from all of a taxpayer’s businesses is less than the 
labor income from those businesses, the excess labor income is 
excluded from the SECA tax base.”122 Profitability has no impact, 
however, on a corporation’s FICA tax liability.123 
Identifying ways to eliminate capital income from the self-
employment tax base proves especially difficult in the context of 
pass-through entities because of the diversity of owner attitudes 
about, contributions to, and goals for these businesses.124 Some 
“passive” owners view the business purely as an investment, 
primarily seek a financial return, and do not actively participate 
in the management of the business.125 These passive owners view 
returns on their “business investments” and returns on other 
investments—such as stocks or bonds—as one and the same. 
Arguably, we should treat the distributive shares of these passive 
owners as capital income, the same as we treat dividends and 
interest.  
Unincorporated business forms also attract “active owners”—
individuals who actively participate in the management of the 
business, provide services, and who may or may not contribute 
capital.126 These owners, of course, also seek a financial return, 
                                                                                                     
 119. CBO SECA REPORT, supra note 3, at iv. 
 120. Id. at v. 
 121. Id. The CBO estimates that 44% of labor income is included. Id. 
 122. Id. at iv. 
 123. See id. at 2 (explaining this difference). 
 124. See Dilley, supra note 8, at 84 (positing that the self-employment tax 
treatment of partnership income “has relied on assumptions . . . about the 
relationship between the partner and the business as the indicator of whether or 
not wages are being paid”). 
 125. See Walter D. Schwidetzky, Integrating Subchapters K and S—Just Do 
It, 62 TAX LAW. 749, 765 (2009) (explaining that “often some owners contribute 
the capital necessary to start the business, while others perform the services 
that will hopefully make the business successful”). 
 126. See id. at 765–66 (contrasting participating and nonparticipating 
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but their return is linked to a greater degree to their 
participation—their labor.127 When these owners receive 
distributive shares of entity income (in lieu of, or in addition to, 
guaranteed payments for services), the transaction looks similar 
to the exchange that occurs when an employer pays wages to an 
employee for work. Thus, the distributive shares of these owners 
are perhaps better characterized as representing income from 
labor. 
If we could easily distinguish active owners from passive 
owners and subject only the active owners to self-employment 
taxes, our self-employment tax system would better comport with 
Congress’s intent to finance Social Security through labor 
income.128 The flexible nature of unincorporated businesses, 
however, accommodates owners from all points on this active–
passive spectrum.129 The ability for an individual to own multiple 
classes of interests in a single business further complicates the 
problem.130 Thus, today’s unincorporated business landscape 
permits few bright-line rules to separate labor income from 
capital income for self-employment purposes. 
                                                                                                     
owners). 
 127. See Sheldon I. Banoff, Renkemeyer Compounds the Confusion in 
Characterizing Limited and General Partners—Part 2, 116 J. TAX’N 300, 317 
(2012) [hereinafter Banoff, Part 2] (explaining that the distributive shares of 
service-providing owners “arise from services they performed . . . rather than as 
earnings that are basically of an investment nature”). 
 128. See Dilley, supra note 8, at 82 (arguing that “all of the statutory, as 
well as regulatory, rules developed to deal with participants in pass-through tax 
entities are grounded in an attempt to discern the part of a self-employed 
person’s income that is actually attributable to her own labor”).  
 129. See Sheldon I. Banoff, Renkemeyer Compounds the Confusion in 
Characterizing Limited and General Partners–Part 1, 115 J. TAX’N 306, 313 
(2011) [hereinafter Banoff, Part 1] (“It is now often difficult to distinguish 
between active owners of the business and passive investors.”). 
 130. See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 113 (2001) (permitting a person to 
hold both a general partner and a limited partner interest in the same 
partnership). 
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IV. I.R.C. § 1402(a)(13): The Limited Partner Exclusion  
A. The Limited Partner Exclusion Generally 
The limited partner exclusion contained in Internal Revenue 
Code § 1402(a)(13) represents one attempt by Congress to 
establish a bright-line rule segregating labor income from capital 
income for self-employment tax purposes. This controversial 
provision131 permits individuals classified as “limited partners” to 
exclude the distributive share of partnership income from self-
employment income.132 More specifically, § 1402(a)(13) permits 
the exclusion of  
the distributive share of any item of income or loss of a limited 
partner, as such, other than guaranteed payments described in 
section 707(c) to that partner for services actually rendered to 
or on behalf of the partnership to the extent that those 
payments are established to be in the nature of remuneration 
for those services[.]133 
Note that salaries and professional fees received for services 
actually rendered—guaranteed payments representing purely 
labor income—remain subject to self-employment tax. 
Congress enacted this provision as part of the Social Security 
Amendments of 1977134 in response to fear that individuals were 
establishing limited partnerships and investing as limited 
partners solely to gain Social Security and Medicare coverage or 
increase their benefit amounts—a practice considered 
“inconsistent with the basic principle of the social security 
program.”135 Prior to 1977, the self-employment tax on the 
                                                                                                     
 131. See Dilley, supra note 8, at 86 (“The SECA tax treatment of LLC 
members continues to be the most controversial aspect of both the LLC and the 
SECA tax areas . . . .”); see also Banoff, Part 1, supra note 129, at 316 (noting 
that there has been “little progress in identifying the operative distinctions 
between ‘general partners’ and ‘limited partners’ for federal tax purposes” 
despite “greater stress and importance on these distinctions” due to the 
evolution of other tax and business laws).  
 132. I.R.C. § 1402(a)(13) (2012). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 313(b), 91 
Stat. 1536. 
 135. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-702 (Part I), at 40–41 (1977) 
Your committee has become increasingly concerned about 
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distributive shares of partnership income made no distinction 
between general and limited partners, enabling individuals—
especially older persons “who may not have been covered under 
the system during their working lives”—to gain insured status 
not through earnings from labor but rather through passive 
investment income.136  
At the time of the limited partner exclusion’s adoption, the 
self-employment tax rate was 7.9% and applied only to the first 
$16,500 of net earnings from self-employment for both Social 
Security and Medicare.137 This low rate existed because the 
earnings ceiling for the Medicare portion had not yet been 
abolished.138 Consequently, at the time, taxpayers widely 
perceived “the value of Social Security benefits . . . to outweigh 
their tax cost.”139 
B. Limited Partners as a Dividing Line 
Given Congress’s goal of funding Medicare and Social 
Security through a tax on labor and considering the business 
                                                                                                     
situations in which certain business organizations solicit 
investments in limited partnerships as a means for an investor 
to become insured for social security benefits. In these 
situations the investor in the limited partnership performs no 
services for the partnership and the social security coverage 
which results is, in fact, based on income from an investment. 
This situation is of course inconsistent with the basic principle 
of the social security program that benefits are designed to 
partially replace lost earnings from work. 
 136. Dilley, supra note 8, at 85; see also Thomas E. Fritz, Flowthrough 
Entities and the Self-Employment Tax: Is It Time for a Uniform Standard?, 17 
VA. TAX REV. 811, 830–31 (1998) (describing Congress’s intent “to curtail the 
practice of investing in a limited partnership as a means for the investor to 
become insured for social security benefits, which congressional lawmakers 
found to be at odds with the fundamental purpose of the social security 
system”). 
 137. Tax Found. Ctr. for Fed. Tax Policy, Social Security and Medicare Tax 
Rates, Calendar Years 1937–2009, TAX FOUND. (May 5, 2009), 
http://taxfoundation.org/article/social-security-and-medicare-tax-rates-calendar-
years-1937-2009 (last visited Sept. 15, 2013) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 138. See supra note 95 (recalling that Congress abolished the HI wage 
ceiling in 1993).  
 139. Dilley, supra note 8, at 85. 
LIMITED PARTNER EXCLUSION 2411 
landscape at the time, Congress’s decision to draw this line 
between limited partners and general partners made sense. In 
1977, there were two primary business entity forms: corporations 
and partnerships (general and limited).140 Corporations, because 
they have employees, are subject to the FICA tax regime.141 
Conversely, partnerships, because of their pass-through entity 
tax status,142 fall within the self-employment tax regime.143  
Within the partnership category, a general partnership did 
not pose the same threat as a limited partnership regarding 
persons investing solely to obtain Social Security and Medicare 
benefits. Because general partners face unlimited personal 
liability for partnership obligations,144 Congress likely thought 
that a prospective investor would not expose himself to such risk 
to obtain Social Security eligibility. Conversely, the limited 
partnership provided an ideal opportunity to obtain benefit 
eligibility through investment145 because it featured two 
                                                                                                     
 140. But see infra Part IV.D (discussing the emergence of new business 
forms in the 1980s and 1990s). 
 141. See I.R.C. § 3121(a) (2012) (noting that for FICA tax purposes, the term 
“wages” includes “all remuneration for employment”); see also Fritz, supra note 
136, at 821 (“Employees of a C corporation (including shareholder-
employees) . . . are subject to employment taxes on 100% of their wages.”). 
 142. See I.R.C. § 701 (“Persons carrying on business as partners shall be 
liable for income tax only in their separate or individual capacities.”). 
Partnerships, unlike corporations, do not pay federal income tax as distinct 
entities. ARTHUR B. WILLIS, JOHN S. PENNELL & PHILIP F. POSTLEWAITE, 
PARTNERSHIP TAXATION § 2.01 (5th ed. 1994). Instead, partnership income 
“passes-through” as distributive shares to the individual partners who must 
report the income and pay any taxes on it through their individual income tax 
returns. See id. § 2.04 (“The principal income tax characteristic of the 
partnership is that it is a conduit through which the various items of 
partnership income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit are passed to the partners 
unchanged and are untaxed at the partnership level.”). 
 143. See I.R.C. § 1401 (defining net income from self-employment to include 
the “distributive share (whether or not distributed) of income or loss . . . from 
any trade or business carried on by a partnership of which [the taxpayer] is a 
member”). 
 144. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 306(a) (1997) (“[A]ll partners are liable 
jointly and severally for all obligations of the partnership unless otherwise 
agreed by the claimant or provided by law.”). 
 145. Cf. Fritz, supra note 136, at 832 (“[A] partner who desires active 
involvement in the partnership’s affairs and minimal exposure to the SECA tax, 
may hold a small portion of his or her ownership interest as a general partner 
and the majority of his or her ownership interest as a limited partner.”). 
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categories of ownership interests,146 including one that offered 
limited liability.147 
At the time, “limited partner” connoted two characteristics: 
limited liability148 and limited (or no) ability to participate in a 
partnership’s management.149 In fact, a limited partner could lose 
her limited liability protection by participating in control of the 
partnership,150 creating a natural check on limited partners’ 
participation levels.  
Thus, a limited partner could make a financial investment in 
a limited partnership, perform little or no labor, enjoy limited 
liability, and gain eligibility for Social Security benefits.151 This 
eligibility pathway created opportunities for abuse and did not 
align with Social Security’s goals of tying benefit eligibility to 
work and funding benefits through a tax on labor.152  
C. Enforcement and Interpretation Before Renkemeyer 
Neither the Internal Revenue Code nor the Treasury 
Regulations define “limited partner.”153 Until the Tax Court 
                                                                                                     
 146. See J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, PARTNERSHIP LAW 
AND PRACTICE § 18.1 (2011) (describing the two categories of limited partnership 
ownership interests). 
 147. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 303(a) (1976) (providing that 
limited partners are not personally liable for partnership obligations). 
 148. Id. 
 149. See CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 146, § 22.2 (explaining that 
although the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (RULPA) does not 
prohibit limited partners from participating in management, limited 
partnership agreements “almost uniformly provide” that limited partners may 
not participate due to the potential loss of limited liability protection). 
 150. See REV. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 303 (1976) (explaining circumstances 
when a limited partner’s participation may make that partner liable for the 
obligations of the limited partnership).  
 151. See Banoff, Part 1, supra note 129, at 337 (describing this scenario). 
 152. See supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text (noting the 
fundamental purposes of Social Security). 
 153. See Schwidetzky, supra note 125, at 788 (“Who qualifies as a limited 
partner is not defined in the Code or Regulations, but it appears from the 
legislative history and the plain language of the statute that a state law limited 
partner is meant.”); see also Banoff, Part 1, supra note 129, at 317 (noting that 
courts likely gave “limited partner” and “general partner” their generally 
accepted, state law meanings because “neither the Code, the legislative history, 
nor prior judicial construction indicated a different definition”). 
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decided Renkemeyer, Campbell & Weaver LLP v. Commissioner in 
2011,154 caselaw interpreting § 1402(a)(13) focused almost 
exclusively on a taxpayer’s status as a general or limited partner 
under state law.155  
Several taxpayers have challenged their liability for self-
employment taxes, arguing that their limited participation 
should permit them to use the limited partner exclusion. Each 
time, the IRS rejected the argument that participation levels—
not legal status under state law—should determine whether one 
qualifies for the limited partner exclusion, and each time, the 
reviewing court affirmed the taxpayers’ self-employment tax 
obligations.156  
In Cokes v. Commissioner,157 the taxpayer inherited working 
oil and gas interests in oil fields operated by a group of oil and 
gas leaseholders158 but did not personally participate in the 
business’s management.159 The court rejected the taxpayer’s 
argument that her lack of control meant that she was not a 
partner in the venture.160 Two years later, another oil and gas 
investor made a similar challenge in Johnson v. Commissioner.161 
The taxpayer first argued that her passive participation did not 
rise to the level of being engaged in a trade or business as 
                                                                                                     
 154. See infra Part VI (discussing the case). 
 155. See Fritz, supra note 136, at 831–32 (“[T]he Code continues to 
rely . . . on local law distinctions as to an individual partner’s legal status rather 
than on the substance of his or her actual relationship to the partnership.”); see 
also infra notes 157–71 and accompanying text (discussing cases where the 
court relied on state law classifications to interpret § 1402(a)(13)).  
 156. See, e.g., Cokes v. Comm’r, 91 T.C. 222, 233–36 (1988) (holding the 
owner of an oil field lease liable for self-employment taxes despite the owner 
having never personally participated in the business because state law treated 
the venture as a partnership). 
 157. 91 T.C. 222 (1988). 
 158. Id. at 225. 
 159. See id. at 228 (“Petitioner never attended a meeting of the . . . working 
interest owners; never voted on any matter . . . ; never obtained any oil and gas 
leases (except for [those inherited]); never drilled any oil wells; never supervised 
any water flood or secondary recovery operations; and never promoted any ‘oil 
deals’ with anyone else.”). 
 160. See id. at 233 (“The question before us is whether petitioner was a 
member of a partnership or of a joint venture treated as a partnership, and 
petitioner’s lack of control does not affect that question.”). 
 161. 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 603 (1990). 
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required by § 1401.162 Alternatively, the taxpayer argued that if 
deemed a partner, the court should recognize her as a limited 
partner due to her minimal participation.163 The Tax Court 
rejected both of these arguments, stating, “[P]etitioner is bound 
by the form in which she cast her transaction. . . . [L]imited 
partnerships are creatures of agreement cast in the form 
prescribed by State law. . . . [S]he and the other working interest 
owners did not take the necessary steps to comply with Texas 
law.”164 
The state-law reliance continued in two later cases in which 
taxpayers acknowledged their state law general partner status 
yet argued that their minimal participation should qualify them 
for the § 1402(a)(13) exclusion. The petitioners in Perry v. 
Commissioner165 and Norwood v. Commissioner166 argued that 
their minimal time commitments to partnership business—six to 
nine hours per year in Perry167 and forty-one hours per year in 
Norwood168—should override their general partner status for self-
employment tax purposes.  
Again, the Tax Court rejected these arguments in favor of 
state law classifications. In Perry, the court said, “Petitioner’s 
personal involvement [in partnership operations] is not the 
critical question where . . . the income was derived from an entity 
taxable as a partnership.”169 Similar to Johnson, the Perry court 
                                                                                                     
 162. See id. (“Petitioner contends that the income from her working interests 
is not subject to self-employment tax because the working interests are merely 
investments; and that her activity in connection with the working interests does 
not rise to the level of carrying on a trade or business.”). 
 163. See id. (“[P]etitioner argues that if she is considered to be a partner in a 
partnership, she should be considered a limited partner due to the nature of her 
interest.”). 
 164. Id.  
 165. T.C. Memo. 1994-215 (1994). 
 166. T.C. Memo. 2000-84 (2000). 
 167. See Perry v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-215, at 1 (1994) (explaining that 
the “approximately 30 to 45 minutes each month” petitioner spends “reviewing 
income and expense statements and depositing checks received” constitutes his 
total participation in the partnership business).  
 168. See Norwood v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-84, at 1 (2000) (explaining 
that petitioner’s involvement in the partnership business in the tax year at 
issue totaled forty-one hours and consisted of “periodic walkthroughs” and 
consultation on “major decisions of the firm”). 
 169. Perry, T.C. Memo 1994-215 at 2. 
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lamented that “[s]tate law requires that certain formalities be 
observed to create a limited partnership . . . . There is no evidence 
of such formalities having been observed by the owners of 
interests in the wells.”170 
Rejecting Norwood’s position, the court matter-of-factly 
stated, “That petitioner spent a minimal amount of time engaged 
in [partnership] operations is irrelevant. . . . Petitioner’s lack of 
participation in or control over [partnership] operations does not 
turn his general partnership interest into a limited partnership 
interest. A limited partnership must be created in the form 
prescribed by State law.”171  
D. Evolution of Business Organizations Since 1977 
Relying on state law classifications to interpret “limited 
partner” made sense during the limited partner exclusion’s early 
years because state-law-based classifications could accommodate 
all of the available unincorporated business ownership interest 
categories. In the years following the provision’s enactment, 
however, several new unincorporated business forms emerged 
and gained popularity.172 These “hybrid” entities borrowed 
characteristics from both the partnership form and the corporate 
form, leading to unpredictability in applying many areas of law, 
including tax law. The decades following § 1402(a)(13)’s 
enactment also brought changes to limited partnership law that 
modified the roles limited partners play in these businesses.173 
After these developments, state law classifications no longer 
describe all of the potential unincorporated business owners. 
Thus, we can attribute many of the current problems interpreting 
the limited partner exclusion to the proliferation of these new 
entities and the changes in the limited partnership form. 
                                                                                                     
 170. Id. at 3. 
 171. Norwood, T.C. Memo 2000-84 at 1. 
 172. See infra Part IV.D.1–3 (describing these new forms). 
 173. See infra Part IV.D.4 (explaining these changes). 
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1. The Limited Liability Company 
LLCs developed in response to a need for a business form 
that would afford its owners limited liability but would not be 
subject to the double-taxation regime applied to corporations.174 
Wyoming passed the first LLC Act in 1977,175 recognizing a 
business form that afforded its owners, called “members,” limited 
liability for the company’s debts and obligations and permitted all 
members to participate in the company’s management.176 
Although Florida passed the second LLC statute—modeled after 
the Wyoming Act—in 1982,177 no other state passed an LLC 
statute until 1990 due to uncertainty regarding LLC tax 
treatment and concerns about members’ personal liability.178 
After the IRS issued a Revenue Ruling in 1988179 stating that 
LLCs properly organized under the Wyoming Act would be 
treated as partnerships for tax purposes,180 other states began 
authorizing LLCs.181 The IRS’s 1996 adoption of the “check-the-
box” regulations182—which created the presumption that LLCs 
would be treated as partnerships unless they elected to be taxed 
as corporations—eliminated the uncertainty.183 By the end of 
1996, all states and the District of Columbia had enacted LLC 
                                                                                                     
 174. LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, 1 RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 1.2 (2013). 
 175. Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, 1977 WYO. SESS. LAWS 537 
(codified at WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-29-101 to -1105 (2012)). 
 176. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29-304 (providing for limited liability); id. 
§ 17-29-407 (providing management rights for all members as a default).  
 177. Florida Limited Liability Company Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.401–.471 
(Supp. 1982). 
 178. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 174, § 1.2 (describing the reasons 
for the delay). 
 179. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360. 
 180. Id. (holding that a “Wyoming limited liability company, none of whose 
members or designated managers are personally liable for any debts of the 
company” is classified for federal tax purposes as a partnership). 
 181. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 174, § 1.2 (noting that “all of the 
remaining states” adopted LLC statutes after the IRS issued these regulations). 
 182. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 to 301.7701-3 (1996). 
 183. See Banoff, Part 1, supra note 129, at 313 (“The advent of the check-
the-box [r]egulations . . . effective after 1996 provided virtual certainty as to the 
tax treatment of domestic LLCs as partnerships (absent their election to be 
taxed as corporations).”). 
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statutes.184 Today, the LLC is the fastest growing unincorporated 
business form,185 and many consider it the closely held business 
“entity of choice” due to its flexibility.186 
2. The Limited Liability Partnership 
LLPs emerged in response to the 1980s savings and loan 
crisis,187 with Texas enacting the first LLP statute in 1991.188 By 
the end of the decade, all states and the District of Columbia had 
enacted LLP statutes.189 The LLP is a general partnership; state 
law characterizes its owners as general partners.190 Registered 
LLPs differ from general partnerships, however, in that LLP 
partners have limited liability for partnership obligations while 
general partners in general or limited partnerships do not.191 The 
                                                                                                     
 184. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 174, § 1.2 (listing the states and 
their enacting legislation).  
 185. See id. § 2.1 (comparing the growth of LLCs with the growth of limited 
and general partnerships in the 1990s and 2000s). From 1993 to 2010, the 
number of LLCs grew from 17,000 to nearly 2.1 million. Id. Conversely, the 
number of general partnerships declined from 1,176,000 to 590,512. Id. The 
number of limited partnerships grew from 275,000 in 1993 to a peak of 432,550 
in 2006 and has been declining since, with 374,889 registered in 2010. Id. 
 186. See, e.g., Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are the New King of the Hill: An 
Empirical Study of the Number of New LLCs, Corporations, and LPs Formed in 
the United States Between 2004–2007 and How Those LLCs Were Taxed for Tax 
Years 2002–2006, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 459, 459–60 (2010) (calling the 
LLC “undeniably the most popular form of new business entity in the United 
States” and noting that “the number of new LLCs formed in America in 2007 
[outpaced] the number of new corporations formed by a margin of nearly two to 
one”). 
 187. See Robert W. Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: 
Present at Birth (Nearly), 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 1065, 1069 (1995) (“The LLP is a 
direct outgrowth of the collapse of real estate and energy prices in the late 
1980s, and the concomitant disaster that befell Texas’s banks and savings and 
loan associations.”). 
 188. 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 3234 (codified at TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. 
§§ 801–803, 805) (1991). 
 189. See CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 146, § 32:1 n.3 (listing the LLP 
statutes for all jurisdictions).  
 190. See id. (“The limited liability partnership (LLP) is a form of general 
partnership, created under state general partnership laws.”). 
 191. Compare REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 306(a) (1997) (providing the 
default rule that “all partners are liable jointly and severally for all obligations 
of the partnership”), with id. § 306(c) (“An obligation of a partnership incurred 
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LLP form, popular in accounting and law firms, functions as 
“‘peace of mind’ insurance for innocent partners,”192 protecting 
their personal assets from risk of negligence or malpractice by 
another partner “over whom [they] ha[ve] no control and quite 
possibly ha[ve] never met.”193 
3. The Limited Liability Limited Partnership 
The limited liability limited partnership (LLLP) emerged in 
the late 1990s and gained sufficient popularity for inclusion in 
the 2001 Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA).194 Unlike the 
LLP, the limited partnership provides the structural basis for the 
LLLP form.195 Similar to the LLP, however, all partners in an 
LLLP—both general and limited—have limited liability 
protection.196 A limited partnership becomes an LLLP by 
registering with the state.197 
4. Changes to Limited Partnerships: The “Control Rule” Fades 
Away 
The years following the limited partner exclusion’s 
enactment also brought changes to the limited partnership form. 
The relaxation and eventual abolishment of the “Control Rule,” 
                                                                                                     
while the partnership is a limited liability partnership, . . . is solely the 
obligation of the partnership. A partner is not personally liable . . . for such a 
partnership obligation solely by reason of being or so acting as a partner.”). 
 192. Hamilton, supra note 187, at 1066. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See Daniel S. Kleinberger, A User’s Guide to the New Uniform Limited 
Partnership Act, 37 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 583, 619–20 (2004) (explaining that the 
drafters of the 2001 ULPA included the LLLP form after recognizing that a 
“growing number” of states had amended their limited partnership statutes to 
permit LLLPs).  
 195. CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 146, § 32:5.  
 196. See UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 404(c) (2001) (“An obligation of a limited 
partnership incurred while the limited partnership is a limited liability limited 
partnership . . . is solely the obligation of the limited partnership. A general 
partner is not personally liable . . . for such an obligation solely by reason of 
being or acting as a general partner.”). 
 197. See id. § 201(a) (noting that a limited partnership must state in its 
certificate whether it is an LLLP). 
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which had long influenced limited partners’ ability to participate 
in partnership business, had a particularly important impact on 
the limited partner exclusion problem. 
Under the Control Rule’s initial formulation, expressed in the 
1916 ULPA,198 a limited partner could lose her limited liability 
protection by “tak[ing] part in the control of the business.”199 This 
potential penalty deterred limited partners from taking active 
roles in partnership management.200 The 1976 Revised Uniform 
Limited Partnership Act (RULPA),201 eventually enacted in all 
but six states,202 relaxed the Control Rule by creating a 
“bifurcated standard of liability” for limited partners.203 If a 
limited partner “[took] part in the control of the business” but did 
not participate to a degree “substantially the same as the exercise 
of the powers of a general partner,” then the limited partner 
could only be liable to creditors with “actual knowledge” of the 
limited partner’s participation in control.204 A limited partner 
who participated to “substantially the same” degree as a general 
partner remained potentially liable to all third parties 
transacting business with the partnership.205 
                                                                                                     
 198. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT (1916). 
 199. See id. § 7 (“A limited partner shall not become liable as a general 
partner unless, in addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited 
partner, he takes part in the control of the business.”). For an illustration of the 
1916 ULPA Control Rule—the prevailing rule when Congress enacted 
§ 1402(a)(13)—consider Holzman v. de Escamilla, 195 P.2d 833 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1948). Holzman held two limited partners in a vegetable business liable as 
general partners because they exercised control of the business (evidenced by 
their involvement in choosing the business’s crops and their ability to control 
partnership funds without the general partner’s consent). Id. at 859–60. 
 200. See Joseph J. Basile, Jr., Limited Liability for Limited Partners: An 
Argument for Abolition of the Control Rule, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1199, 1201 (1985) 
(“[A]n obvious tension arises between the limited partners’ desire to exercise 
control over important decisions affecting the partnership and the threat of 
personal liability for taking part, or participating, in the control of the business 
of the partnership.”). 
 201. REV. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT (1976). 
 202. See Unif. Law Comm’n, Enactment Status Map, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
ACT (1976), available at http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Limited 
Partnership Act (last visited Sept. 15, 2013) (highlighting states that enacted 
the 1976 RULPA) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 203. Basile, supra note 200, at 1210. 
 204. REV. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 303 (1976). 
 205. See Basile, supra note 200, at 1211 (explaining this scenario). Basile 
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The 1985 RULPA revisions further limited the Control Rule’s 
scope. These amendments provided that a limited partner who 
participated in the control of the business would be liable only “to 
persons who transact business with the limited partnership 
reasonably believing, based upon the limited partner’s conduct, 
that the limited partner is a general partner.”206 Finally, the 2001 
ULPA, adopted by eighteen states,207 eliminated the Control Rule 
entirely, stating:  
An obligation of a limited partnership, whether arising in 
contract, tort, or otherwise, is not the obligation of a limited 
partner. A limited partner is not personally liable, directly or 
indirectly, by way of contribution or otherwise, for an 
obligation of the limited partnership solely by reason of being 
a limited partner, even if the limited partner participates in the 
management and control of the limited partnership.208 
Without the Control Rule to deter participation, limited partners 
in states adopting the 2001 ULPA today face no disincentive to 
participate actively in a limited partnership’s management.  
E. Problems Presented by New Unincorporated Entity Forms 
These new forms (and the limited partnership’s evolution) 
create problems in applying the limited partner exclusion because 
they violate the “fundamental assumptions” about limited 
partnerships that first prompted Congress to enact the 
exclusion.209 The dividing line Congress believed existed between 
limited partners and general partners in 1977 (limited partners 
                                                                                                     
also notes that this structure prevents a limited partner from “exercis[ing] all of 
the powers of a general partner while avoiding any direct dealings with third 
parties” to retain her limited liability. Id. (quoting RULPA § 303 cmt.). 
 206. REV. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 303 (1985). 
 207. See Unif. Law Comm’n, Enactment Status Map, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
ACT (2001), http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Limited Partnership Act (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2013) (highlighting states that have enacted the 2001 ULPA) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 208. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 303 (2001) (emphasis added).  
 209. See John R. Marquis, Current Status of Limited Liability Companies 
and the Self-Employment Income Tax, MICH. B.J., May 1998, at 440, 441 
(explaining that changes, such as the RULPA’s expanded partner participation 
rules, “call into question the fundamental assumptions” on which Congress 
founded the exception). 
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with limited liability and limited participation on one side; 
general partners with unlimited liability and full participation on 
the other) no longer exists.210 “Limited partner” no longer 
unequivocally means “passive investor.” 
Arguably, none of today’s unincorporated business forms fit 
the archetypal limited partner structure that Congress relied on 
in 1977. LLPs and LLLPs afford both general and limited 
partners limited liability.211 As a definitional matter, LLCs have 
neither limited partners nor general partners. All LLC members 
may participate in management, and all may benefit from limited 
liability, regardless of their level of participation.212 Further, the 
LLC form can accommodate both owners who use it as a passive 
investment vehicle and owners who seek to conduct an active 
business.213 Even the trusty limited partnership no longer fits the 
mold.214  
Uncertainty for taxpayers and tax professionals and 
unpredictability within the self-employment tax regime has 
developed. Without definitive guidance from the IRS or Congress 
on how to apply the “old” rule to “new” businesses, taxpayers 
have freedom to interpret the rule for themselves. This freedom 
creates opportunities for taxpayers to organize their businesses in 
such a way as to avoid self-employment taxes entirely or to take 
aggressive tax positions that they would be less likely to take if 
clear guidance existed.215 For example, an LLC member could 
argue that her limited liability entitles her to exclude her income 
under § 1402(a)(13) even though statutorily speaking, she does 
not hold a limited partner interest and her business is not a 
                                                                                                     
 210. See supra Part IV.D.1–4 (discussing unincorporated business entity 
changes). 
 211. See supra note 191 and accompanying text (discussing LLPs); see also 
supra note 196 and accompanying text (providing the rule for LLLPs). 
 212. See supra Part IV.D.1 (detailing the LLC form). 
 213. See Schwidetsky, supra note 125, at 790 (comparing members’ 
authority in member-managed LLCs and manager-managed LLCs). 
 214. See Marquis, supra note 209, at 441 (questioning whether the limited 
partner exclusion’s assumption that limited partners in traditional limited 
partnerships do not participate in management has “any lingering validity”).  
 215. See Dilley, supra note 8, at 81–82 (noting the “considerable time and 
effort” taxpayers and tax planners have spent “developing strategies for 
recasting income that might be considered self-employment earnings as passive 
types of income that are excluded from the [SECA tax] base”).  
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limited partnership.216 Accepting this argument—limited liability 
as a sufficient condition for the limited partner exclusion—would 
create a gaping hole in the self-employment tax base.217 
Conversely, a passive LLC member who prefers a more 
conservative stance given the dearth of guidance on the issue 
may choose not to claim the limited partner exclusion. This choice 
would likely inject capital income into the self-employment tax 
base, another disfavored result. 
Finally, the lack of guidance leads to disparate treatment of 
similarly situated taxpayers across various business forms.218 The 
uncertainty may even prompt a taxpayer who prefers one form to 
select another because it provides a more certain path to obtain 
the exclusion for legitimately passive owners.219 
V. Attempts to Interpret and Apply § 1402(a)(13) in the Modern 
Business Context 
Recognizing these issues, the Treasury Department has twice 
attempted to provide guidance to taxpayers on how to interpret 
the limited partner exclusion. Regulations proposed in 1994 dealt 
specifically with interpretation issues faced by LLC members;220 
the 1997 proposed regulations aimed to provide guidance to all 
unincorporated business entities.221 Analyzing these proposed 
regulations reveals a shift in the IRS’s position from reliance on 
state law classifications to analysis of an owner’s participation in 
the business. This shift reflects the IRS’s desire to realign the 
                                                                                                     
 216. See infra Part VI.A (discussing Renkemeyer, in which the LLP partner 
made essentially the same argument). 
 217. See Banoff, Part 1, supra note 129, at 319–20 (finding it “troublesome” 
and “inappropriate” to use limited versus unlimited liability for this purpose). 
 218. See Marquis, supra note 209, at 441 (“Why should a limited partner 
who does not participate in his . . . partnership’s business affairs escape [self-
employment taxes] while an LLC member who chooses not to participate in . . . 
her LLC’s affairs cannot? . . . Are they not ‘functionally’ the same vis-à-vis the 
entity (neither participates and both have limited liability)?”). 
 219. See id. (“Why should business persons be forced to cho[o]se a limited 
partnership form over an LLC form just to avoid the possibility that one of the 
participants would have [net earnings from self-employment] from the LLC 
when he or she would not from the limited partnership?”). 
 220. See infra Part V.A (discussing the 1994 proposed regulations). 
 221. See infra Part V.B (discussing the 1997 proposed regulations). 
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limited partner exclusion with its original purpose: to remove 
income from passive capital investments from the SECA tax base. 
A. 1994 Proposed Treasury Regulations 
The first attempt to clear some of the confusion regarding the 
meaning of “limited partner” came in 1994 when the IRS issued 
proposed regulations222 that applied § 1402(a)(13) to LLCs 
classified as partnerships for federal tax purposes.223 These 
regulations offered a two-part analysis—comprising the 
“Management Test” and “Limited Partner Equivalency Test”—for 
determining whether an LLC member would be considered a 
“limited partner” for § 1402(a)(13) purposes.224 To pass the 
Management Test, an LLC member could not be a “manager”225—
meaning she had to lack authority to make management 
decisions for the LLC.226 A taxpayer could easily apply this test 
because LLC operating agreements typically specify whether the 
LLC is member-managed or manager-managed and delineate any 
management rights of members outside of default rules.227  
After satisfying the Management Test, the taxpayer would 
then analyze her company under the two-part Limited Partner 
Equivalency Test. This test first asks whether the LLC could 
have been formed as a limited partnership rather than an LLC in 
                                                                                                     
 222. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-18, 59 Fed. Reg. 67253 (Dec. 29, 1994). 
 223. See generally id. See also Timothy R. Koski, Self-Employment Tax and 
Limited Liability Companies: When Are LLC Earnings Subject to Self-
Employment Tax?, TAXES, Sept. 2005, at 33, 34 (describing the proposed 
regulations and their purposes). Recall that the “check-the-box” regulations 
providing that LLCs would be treated as partnerships for tax purposes as a 
default were not issued until 1996. See supra note 182 and accompanying text 
(explaining the “check-the-box” regulations). 
 224. Koski, supra note 223, at 34. 
 225. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(b)(1), 59 Fed. Reg. at 67254. 
 226. See id. § 1.1402(c)(2) (defining “manager” as a person who “alone or 
together with others, is vested with the continuing exclusive authority to make 
the management decisions necessary to conduct the business for which the LLC 
was formed”). 
 227. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 407(a) (2006) (establishing 
member-management as a default rule unless the operating agreement elects 
manager-management). 
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the same jurisdiction where it was formed.228 Next, the test asks 
whether the member “could have qualified as a limited partner in 
that limited partnership under applicable law.”229 If the taxpayer 
could answer both questions affirmatively, she would be treated 
as a limited partner for § 1402(a)(13) purposes.230 
The proposed regulations received a “mixed response.”231 
Critics expressed concern that the Limited Partner Equivalency 
Test’s reliance on state law classifications would create 
possibilities for disparate treatment.232 Because state limited 
partner statutes differ in the extent to which they allow limited 
partners to participate in management, a participating, 
nonmanager LLC member could satisfy the test (and benefit from 
the § 1402(a)(13) exclusion) if his LLC was formed in one state, 
but fail it (denying him the exclusion) if his LLC had been formed 
in another.233  
Commentators also criticized the proposed regulations as 
being too complex, claiming that applying the regulations 
“depend[s] upon legal or factual determinations that may be 
difficult for taxpayers or the IRS to make with certainty.”234 
Others supported a “material participation” test for LLC 
members, claiming that it would eliminate uncertainty and better 
serve the policy goal of including labor income in the self-
employment tax base.235 Other critics argued that the regulations 
fell short because they failed to establish a uniform test 
                                                                                                     
 228. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(b)(2), 59 Fed. Reg. 67253, 67254 (Dec. 29, 
1994). 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id.  
 231. Koski, supra note 223, at 34.  
 232. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)–2, 62 Fed. Reg. 1702, 1702 (Jan. 13, 
1997) (describing comments received in response to the 1994 regulations that 
highlighted the possibility for disparate treatment between members of different 
LLCs with “identical rights” based solely on state limited partnership statute 
differences). 
 233. See Koski, supra note 223, at 34 (explaining the possibility for disparate 
treatment). 
 234. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)–2, 62 Fed. Reg. at 1702. 
 235. See id. (noting that a material participation test would “better 
implement the self-employment tax goal of taxing compensation for services”). 
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applicable to all unincorporated entities whose owners may be 
subject to self-employment tax.236  
Finally, some commentators stated that the proposed 
regulations did not adequately address the self-employment tax 
treatment of taxpayers holding more than one class of ownership 
interest.237 These critics claimed the proposed regulations created 
an “all-or-nothing” test that would prevent members who held 
both “limited-partner-like” and “general-partner-like” LLC 
interests from using § 1402(a)(13) to exclude income from their 
limited-partner-like interests.238 Citing § 1402(a)(13)’s legislative 
history, these critics argued that this system violated Congress’s 
intention to tax only general partners’ distributive shares and 
demanded that the Treasury Department revise the regulations 
to respect the bifurcation of ownership interests.239 
B. 1997 Proposed Treasury Regulations 
Recognizing the 1994 proposed regulations’ weaknesses, the 
Treasury Department withdrew its 1994 notice of proposed 
rulemaking and simultaneously proposed new regulations in 
January 1997.240 The 1997 proposed regulations would apply to 
“all entities classified as a partnership for federal tax purposes, 
regardless of state law characterization of the entity.”241 
According to the IRS, this uniform standard would analyze “the 
relationship between the partner, the partnership, and the 
                                                                                                     
 236. See id. (preferring a “more uniform approach” to govern all 
unincorporated business entities).  
 237. See id. (discussing issues surrounding ownership interest bifurcation). 
 238. See id. (“The proposed regulations treated an LLC member as a limited 
partner with respect to his . . . entire interest (if the member was not a manager 
and satisfied the limited partner equivalence test), or not at all (if either the 
management test or limited partner equivalence test was not satisfied).”); see 
also Koski, supra note 223, at 34 (explaining that the proposed regulations 
classified a partner as “either a general partner or a limited partner with 
respect to his entire interest in the partnership”). 
 239. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2, 62 Fed. Reg. 1702, 1702 (Jan. 13, 
1997) (outlining these critics’ legislative history-based argument that Congress 
intended to subject only general partnership interests to self-employment 
taxes). 
 240. Id.  
 241. Id. at 1703. 
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partnership’s business”242 rather than treat state law 
characterizations of partners as determinative.243 The analysis 
would rely on functional tests related to the individual’s 
participation in the business.244 Affirming the 1994 regulation 
feedback, the IRS noted that the new approach would ensure that 
similarly situated taxpayers did not receive differing self-
employment tax treatment based solely on their entity’s state of 
formation.245 The IRS acknowledged the need for a functional test 
in light of the “proliferation” of new business entities and the 
“evolution of state limited partnership statutes”—specifically, the 
extent to which some limited partners may now participate while 
retaining limited liability.246  
Unlike the 1994 regulations, the 1997 regulations presumed 
limited partnership status for § 1402(a)(13) purposes unless the 
taxpayer met one of three tests.247 The first test (the “Liability 
Test”) denied limited partner status to individuals who had 
“personal liability . . . for the debts of or claims against the 
partnership by reason of being a partner.”248 Second, an 
individual with “authority to contract on behalf of the 
partnership under the statute or law pursuant to which the 
partnership is organized” would not retain limited partner status 
(the “Authority Test”).249 The final test (the “Material 
Participation Test”) focused on the extent of an owner’s 
participation in the business.250 Any individual who 
                                                                                                     
 242. Id.  
 243. See id. (“State law characterizations of an individual as a ‘limited 
partner’ or otherwise are not determinative.”). This language suggests that the 
participation standard would apply even to an individual properly characterized 
as a “limited partner” under state law. 
 244. See id. at 1702 (detailing the functional tests). 
 245. See id. (“By adopting these functional tests, the proposed regulations 
ensure that similarly situated individuals owning interests in entities formed 
under different statutes or in different jurisdictions will be treated similarly.”). 
 246. Id. 
 247. Compare Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(2), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702, 1704 
(Jan. 13, 1997) (“An individual is treated as a limited partner . . . unless . . . .” 
(emphasis added)), with Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-18, 59 Fed. Reg. 67253, 
67253 (Dec. 29, 1994) (“[A] member of an LLC will be treated as a limited 
partner only if . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 248. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(2)(i), 62 Fed. Reg. at 1704. 
 249. Id. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(2)(ii). 
 250. See id. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(2)(iii) (describing the test). 
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“participate[d] in the partnership’s trade or business for more 
than 500 hours during the partnership’s taxable year” would not 
be considered a limited partner.251  
In addition, the regulations excepted “service partnerships”—
defined as partnerships in which “substantially all” activities 
relate to the performance of services in the fields of health, law, 
engineering, architecture, accounting, actuarial science, or 
consulting—from the general test.252 “Service partners”—
individuals providing services “to or on behalf of the service 
partnership’s trade or business”253—could not utilize the limited 
partner exception, even if they satisfied the three functional 
tests.254 
The 1997 proposal also addressed bifurcated ownership 
interests. Proposed Treasury Regulation § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(3) 
permits an individual who fails the functional tests (by holding a 
general-partner-like interest) to nonetheless exclude income 
related to his limited-partner-like ownership interest upon 
meeting two conditions.255 First, there must be other owners of 
the purported limited-partnership-like class of interest who 
satisfy the functional tests set forth in Proposed Regulation 
§ 1.1402(a)-2(h)(2).256 Second, the individual owning the 
bifurcated interest must have rights and obligations with respect 
to the limited-partner-like ownership interest that are identical 
to the rights and obligations of the other limited partners.257 
The regulations also provide a path to limited partner status 
for individuals who hold only one class of ownership interest and 
fail only the Material Participation Test.258 Similar to the 
bifurcated-interest holder, the “material participant” can still 
                                                                                                     
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(6)(iii). 
 253. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(6)(ii), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702, 1704 (Jan. 
13, 1997). The regulations provide that a partner is not considered a “service 
partner” if he “only provides a de minimis amount of services to or on behalf of 
the partnership.” Id. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(6)(ii). 
 254. See id. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(5) (clarifying that a service partner in a service 
partnership may not gain limited partner status under any of the three tests in 
§1.1402(a)-2(h)(2)–(4)).  
 255. See id. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(3) (noting this possibility). 
 256. See id. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(3)(i) (explaining this condition). 
 257. See id. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(3)(ii) (explaining this condition). 
 258. See id. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(4) (describing the exclusion). 
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receive limited partner treatment if the entity has other owners 
who satisfy the functional tests and the material participant’s 
rights and obligations are identical to the rights of the limited 
partners.259 In this scenario, the taxpayer would pay self-
employment tax on guaranteed payments for her services but 
could exclude her distributive share under § 1402(a)(13).260 
Together, these two rules work toward the goal of excluding 
“amounts that are demonstrably returns on capital invested in 
the partnership” rather than labor.261 
The 1997 proposed regulations were “severely criticized by 
Congress.”262 Influenced by prominent business leaders such as 
Steve Forbes, who called the proposed regulations “a major tax 
increase by a stealth regulatory decree,”263 Congress feared that 
the proposed regulations—specifically the Material Participation 
Test—would adversely affect small businesses.264 Discussion of 
the proposed regulations through popular media channels like 
The Rush Limbaugh Show allowed the proposed regulations to 
gain “wide notoriety among the rank and file voters, most of 
whom it is safe to say had little understanding of their real effect, 
intended or otherwise.”265 
 Practitioners noted that the regulations generated criticism 
because they “appeared to change the statutory rules so as to 
make more limited partners subject to the self-employment tax.266 
In reality, these practitioners said, the regulations were more 
                                                                                                     
 259. See id. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(4)(i)–(ii) (explaining this exception). 
 260. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702, 1703 (Jan. 13, 
1997) (describing how the proposed regulation would apply to this scenario). 
 261. Id. 
 262. Koski, supra note 223, at 36. 
 263. William H. Byrnes & Robert Bloink, Tax Court Revives Partnership Self 
Employment Tax Debate, ADVISORONE (Mar. 25, 2011), 
http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2011/03/25/tax-court-revives-partnership-self-em 
ployment-tax?t=legal-compliance&page=2 (last visited Sept. 15, 2013) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 264. See id. (stating that twenty-three senators expressed specific concerns 
about the Material Participation Test’s impact on small business owners’ tax 
bills). 
 265. Marquis, supra note 209, at 442. 
 266. Id. 
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likely to significantly decrease the number of LLC members 
subject to the tax.267  
C. Regulatory Moratorium and Aftermath 
Nonetheless, the criticism led Congress to enact a one-year 
moratorium on the rulemaking process for the proposed 
regulations.268 Despite the moratorium’s limited duration, the 
IRS, having many other regulatory and enforcement priorities, 
likely interpreted the moratorium as an order not to raise the 
issue again—not in one year, and perhaps not ever. A nonbinding 
resolution269 passed in conjunction with the moratorium supports 
this interpretation. The resolution expressed the Senate’s concern 
that the proposed regulations “exceed[] the regulatory authority 
of the Treasury Department and would effectively change the law 
administratively without congressional action.”270 Further, the 
resolution stated, “It is the sense of the Senate that . . . Congress, 
not the Department of the Treasury or the Internal Revenue 
Service, should determine the tax law governing self-employment 
income for limited partners.”271 
In the fifteen years since the moratorium expired, neither 
Congress nor the IRS has restarted the rulemaking process.272 
Taxpayers and tax professionals remain uncertain regarding the 
proposed regulations’ importance because the IRS never officially 
withdrew them.273 While some scholars and practitioners have 
                                                                                                     
 267. See id. (predicting that the regulations would have subjected fewer LLC 
members to self-employment tax). 
 268. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 935, 111 Stat. 
788, 882 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (providing that “no 
temporary or final regulation with respect to the definition of a limited partner 
under section 1402(a)(13) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 may be issued or 
made effective before July 1, 1998”). 
 269. 143 CONG. REC. S6693–96 (daily ed. June 27, 1997). 
 270. Id. at S6694. 
 271. Id. (emphasis added). 
 272. See Koski, supra note 223, at 36 (noting that the regulations have not 
been finalized and neither Congress nor the IRS has issued any other definitive 
guidance). 
 273. See, e.g., ROBERT R. KEATINGE, NEW CURRENTS IN SELF-EMPLOYMENT 
TAXES AND THE DEFINITION OF “LIMITED PARTNER”: PLANNING IN LIGHT OF 
RENKEMEYER, THE MEDICARE TAX CHANGES WHICH TAKE EFFECT IN 2013, AND 
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called the proposed regulations “the most definitive guidance 
available” on how to apply § 1402(a)(13) to LLCs,274 others believe 
the regulations have limited value. For these critics, such as 
Robert Keatinge, the only truly “definitive guidance” on how to 
apply § 1402(a)(13) to LLCs comes from private letter rulings 
issued in the mid-1990s, which held that the provision did not 
exclude LLC members’ distributive shares from self-employment 
taxes.275 Keatinge believes these rulings suggest that all LLC 
members, “regardless of the level of their activities or their 
authority or participation in management” are subject to self-
employment tax.”276 Despite his reluctance to rely on the 
proposed regulations in advising clients, Keatinge acknowledges 
that according to Treasury Regulation § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii),277 the 
IRS considers proposed regulations “substantial authority” for 
purposes of avoiding accuracy-related penalties related to tax 
underpayment.278  
After the moratorium’s political uproar faded, the limited 
partner exclusion problem received little publicity until 2011, 
when an aggressive tax position taken by three lawyers from 
Kansas gave the Tax Court the perfect opportunity to suggest a 
new interpretation of § 1402(a)(13). 
                                                                                                     
OTHER DEVELOPMENTS 12–13 (2012) (discussing the effect of regulations that 
have been issued but have not yet become effective) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 274. Koski, supra note 223, at 34. 
 275. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9525058 (June 23, 1995) (ruling that 
distributive shares of members of a prospective law firm LLC would be subject 
to self-employment tax); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9452024 (Dec. 30, 1994) 
(explaining that although an LLC is classified as a partnership for federal tax 
purposes, an LLC is not a limited partnership and its members are not limited 
partners, meaning that self-employment taxes apply to LLC distributive 
shares); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9432018 (Aug. 12, 1994) (determining that LLC 
members’ distributive shares did not qualify for exclusion from self-employment 
tax based on § 1402(a)(13)); see also KEATINGE, supra note 273, at 13 (explaining 
his interpretation of the private letter rulings). 
 276. KEATINGE, supra note 273, at 13. 
 277. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) (2003). 
 278. See id. (listing “proposed, temporary and final regulations” construing 
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code as sources of substantial authority 
related to accuracy-related penalties for understating tax liabilities); see also 
KEATINGE, supra note 273, at 13 (acknowledging the regulations’ value for this 
purpose). 
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VI. Renkemeyer Renews Attention on the Issue 
The February 2011 ruling in Renkemeyer, Campbell & 
Weaver LLP v. Commissioner renewed attention on the limited 
partner exclusion not only because the case demonstrates the 
potential for abuse created by the provision’s uncertainty, but 
also because the Tax Court departed from precedent in 
abandoning strict reliance on state law classifications to instead 
rely on the legislative intent behind § 1402(a)(13) and apply a 
participation-focused standard. 
A. Analyzing Renkemeyer 
The petitioner-taxpayer, Troy Renkemeyer, performed legal 
services as a partner in a law firm organized as an LLP under 
Kansas law.279 For tax year 2004, the LLP had four partners: 
Renkemeyer, two other attorneys (Todd Campbell and Tracy 
Weaver), and RCGW Investment Management, an S corporation 
owned by RCGW Investment Management Inc., Employee Stock 
Ownership Plan and Trust (ESOP).280 The ESOP listed 
Renkemeyer, Weaver, and Campbell as its beneficiaries.281 Each 
attorney partner held a one-third capital interest and a 30% 
profits and loss interest in the firm.282 The S corporation held the 
remaining 10% profits and loss interest.283 In 2004, despite 
deriving 99% of its net business income from fees for legal 
services rendered by Renkemeyer, Campbell, and Weaver, the 
law firm allocated 87.557% of its net business income to the S 
corporation.284 In tax year 2005, the law firm reorganized, 
eliminating the S corporation partner and assigning each of the 
remaining three partners—Renkemeyer, Campbell, and 
                                                                                                     
 279. Renkemeyer, Campbell & Weaver, LLP v. Comm’r, 136 T.C., 137, 138 
(2011). 
 280. Id. at 138–39. 
 281. Id. at 139. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. at 139–40. 
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Weaver—a 1% “General Managing Partner Interest” and a 32% 
“Investing Partner Interest.”285  
None of the attorney partners included their partnership 
distributive shares on their tax returns as net income from self-
employment.286 Instead, Renkemeyer argued that the IRS should 
characterize his interest (along with Campbell’s and Weaver’s) as 
a limited partner interest, which would exclude the income from 
net earnings from self-employment under I.R.C. § 1402(a)(13).287 
Renkemeyer said that his interest deserved this classification 
because the law firm’s organizational documents “designated [the 
attorney-partners’ interests] as limited partnership interests” 
and because the partners “enjoy[ed] limited liability pursuant to 
Kansas law.”288 
The Tax Court rejected Renkemeyer’s argument.289 The court 
began its analysis by contrasting the state-law-based 
characteristics of LLPs and limited partnerships. It emphasized 
that unlike an LLP, a limited partnership features two distinct 
classes of partnership interests: general partners and limited 
partners.290 The court also noted that in traditional limited 
partnerships, limited partners lack management power and have 
limited liability for partnership debts so long as they do not 
actively participate in the control of the partnership (mentioning 
RULPA 1976).291 Accordingly, these characteristics beget the 
inference that “the interest of a limited partner in a limited 
partnership is generally akin to that of a passive investor.”292 In 
contrast, general partnerships registered under state law as 
LLPs—such as Renkemeyer’s firm—allow partners to enjoy both 
limited liability and management powers.293 
                                                                                                     
 285. Id. at 141–42. 
 286. Id. at 139. 
 287. Id. at 147. 
 288. Id. Note that Mr. Renkemeyer did not argue that his LLP was a limited 
partnership under Kansas law. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. at 147–48. 
 293. See id. at 148 (“In essence, an L.L.P. is a general partnership that 
affords a form of limited liability protection for all its partners by filing a 
statement of qualification with the appropriate state authorities.”). 
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The court then reviewed potential authority to aid in 
interpreting § 1402(a)(13). After noting that Congress enacted the 
limited partner exclusion “at a time (1977) before entities such as 
L.L.P.s were contemplated,”294 the court considered the 1994 and 
1997 Proposed Treasury Regulations, which aimed to provide 
guidance on applying § 1402(a)(13) to modern business forms.295 
Because Congress and the Treasury Department had never 
enacted the regulations nor issued any other “pronouncements 
with respect to the definition of a limited partner for purposes of 
the self-employment tax,”296 the court said it was “left to interpret 
the statute without elaboration.”297 
Accepting that “limited partner” has no accepted “ordinary 
meaning,” the court focused on the limited partner exclusion’s 
legislative history to discern a definition.298 Specifically, the court 
focused on the limited partner exclusion’s original purpose: to 
prevent individuals from using earnings that are “basically of an 
investment nature” to receive Social Security benefits.299 From 
this analysis, the court concluded that “[t]he legislative history of 
section 1402(a)(13) does not support a holding that Congress 
contemplated excluding partners who performed services for a 
partnership in their capacity as partners . . . from liability for 
self-employment taxes.”300 The Tax Court then held that the 
petitioners owed self-employment taxes on their distributive 
shares because the earnings arose from the legal services the 
taxpayers had performed.301 
                                                                                                     
 294. Id. 
 295. See id. at 148–49 (describing the 1997 proposed regulations and the 
negative response that led to Congress issuing the 1998 moratorium). 
 296. Id. at 149. 
 297. Id. 
 298. See id. (“It is a well-established rule of construction that if a statute 
does not define a term, the term is to be given its ordinary meaning. . . . And we 
look to the legislative history to ascertain Congress’ intent if the statutory 
purpose is obscured by ambiguity.”).  
 299. See id. at 149–50 (“‘The bill would exclude from social security 
coverage, the distributive share of income or loss received by a limited partner 
from the trade or business of a limited partnership. This is to exclude for 
coverage purposes certain earnings which are basically of an investment 
nature.’” (quoting H. R. REP. NO. 95-702, at 11 (1977))). 
 300. Id. at 150. 
 301. See id. (finding it “clear that the partners’ distributive shares of the law 
firm’s income did not arise as a return on the partners’ investment” but instead 
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B. Responses to Renkemeyer 
A general consensus exists that the Tax Court correctly ruled 
against the petitioner in Renkemeyer302 in light of the taxpayer’s 
“aggressive”—to some, “ridiculous”303—position.304 Although the 
result—requiring Renkemeyer to pay self-employment taxes on 
the disputed income—did not surprise many in the tax 
community, the court’s analysis in reaching that result and its 
perceived implications have elicited a spirited response. 
First, critics note that the Renkemeyer facts provided an easy 
path for the court to rule for the government—one that did not 
require inquiry into legislative history. Because Kansas law 
recognized Renkemeyer and associates as “general partners,” the 
court needed only to cite the three previous cases (Johnson, 
Perry, and Norwood),305 which found state law partner status 
determinative.306 The opinion did not mention those cases, nor 
did it directly declare that Renkemeyer, Campbell, and Weaver 
were “not limited partners” (even though it mentioned that 
                                                                                                     
“arose from legal services [the partners]performed on behalf of the law firm” and 
were thus subject to self-employment taxes). 
 302. See Banoff, Part 2, supra note 127, at 300 (calling the decision 
“correct”); Thomas R. Wechter, Are Service Performing Partners of LPs, LLPs or 
LLCs Exempt From Self-Employment Taxes?, AICPA TAX INSIDER, Aug. 2011, 
available at http://www.duanemorris.com/articles/are_service_performing_ 
partners_exempt_from_self_employment_taxes_4183.html (calling the decision 
“not a surprise”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 303. See Shamik Trivedi, Renkemeyer Facts Limit Decision’s Scope, 
Practitioners Say, 133 TAX NOTES 555, 555 (Oct. 31, 2011) (quoting one 
practitioner who said, “Seeing law firm partners trying to assert that they’re not 
subject to self-employment taxes seems ridiculous”). 
 304. See Susan L. Megaard & Michael M. Megaard, Reducing Self-
Employment Taxes on Owners of LLPs and LLCs After Renkemeyer, PRAC. TAX 
STRATEGIES, Aug. 2011, at 52, 52 (calling the result “not surprising”). 
 305. See supra Part IV.C (discussing these cases). 
 306. See Amy S. Elliott, Tax Court Decision Could Reignite Debate over 
Partnerships and Employment Taxes, 130 TAX NOTES 1244, 1245 (Mar. 14, 2011) 
(“By issuing [the opinion] the court opted not to do what other courts ruling in 
this area have done, which was simply to hold that [petitioners] were not limited 
partners of a state law [limited partnership] and therefore could not take 
advantage of the [limited partner exclusion].”); see also Banoff, Part 2, supra 
note 127, at 304–05 (criticizing the court’s assertion that “limited partner” is a 
term “obscured by ambiguity” given that courts have found the term’s ordinary 
meaning “clear, under state law”). 
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Kansas law recognizes their LLP as a general partnership).307 
Also, Sheldon I. Banoff noted that neither party’s brief discussed 
§ 1402(a)(13)’s legislative history “[n]or gave any mention of it as 
being relevant” to resolving the issue.308 
Critics have also expressed frustration that Renkemeyer 
creates more uncertainty in an area of law already quite 
uncertain.309 Some practitioners fear that the Tax Court’s 
emphasis on participation to determine limited partner status 
implies that even those individuals classified as limited partners 
by state law—the exact group the limited partner exclusion 
originally targeted—may forfeit the exclusion through 
substantial participation.310  
Finally, observers claim Renkemeyer has created further 
confusion regarding the applicability of the 1997 proposed 
regulations to LLP partners and LLC members.311 Some say the 
court’s “functional” approach—looking at whether a partner 
actively participated in the partnership and whether income from 
the partnership is predominantly “of an investment nature”—
closely resembles the 1997 proposed regulations’ functional 
approach.312 Though the Renkemeyer Court mentioned the 
proposed regulations, it did not directly affirm or dismiss them, 
                                                                                                     
 307. See Renkemeyer, Campbell & Weaver, LLP v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 137, 
147–48 (2011) (explaining that LLPs retain their general partnership status 
under Kansas law); see also Wechter, supra note 302 (criticizing the decision for 
taking a functional approach “[r]ather than merely holding that a partner in a 
state law LLP is not a [limited partner] for purposes of self-employment tax”). 
 308. Banoff, Part 2, supra note 127, at 305. 
 309. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 306, at 1246 (“[P]ractitioners said that the 
level of uncertainty in this area is so great that not only would it be common to 
find inconsistent positions taken within an accounting firm, but also it wouldn’t 
be surprising to find inconsistent positions taken by the same accountant.”).  
 310. See KEATINGE, supra note 273, at 15 (“If, as the opinion suggests, 
‘limited partner’ must be understood by reference to whether the partner 
performs services, the opinion might be broadly read to hold that a limited 
partner under state law who performs services is not a ‘limited partner’ for 
purposes of IRC § 1402(a)(13).”). 
 311. See id. at 15 (“The opinion calls into question whether the 1997 
Regulations have application to partners in LLPs and members in LLCs.”); see 
also Banoff, Part 2, supra note 127, at 308–15 (describing these concerns). 
 312. See Wechter, supra note 302 (comparing the court’s approach to the 
1997 proposed regulations). 
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stating only that without final regulations, the court felt obliged 
“to interpret the statute without elaboration.”313 
Following the Renkemeyer decision, IRS special counsel 
Dianna Miosi, while speaking at the May 2011 American Bar 
Association Section of Taxation meeting, stated that taxpayers 
“can rely” on the 1997 proposed regulations.314 Still, conservative 
practitioners argue that “can” rely does not mean “should” rely 
and question advising clients based on Miosi’s comments.315 
VII. The Next-Best Solution: Adopt a Material Participation 
Standard 
The reactions to Renkemeyer illustrate the tax community’s 
desire for definitive interpretive guidance. The case exemplifies 
the inconsistency—and in some instances, abuse—that 
§ 1402(a)(13)’s current murky status has produced. The ideal 
solution to this problem would be a standard that required each 
business owner to characterize each dollar of her distributive 
share of entity income as either a return on labor or a return on 
capital. Only the portion categorized as a return on labor would 
be subject to self-employment taxes. This solution, as previously 
discussed, is not practicable because it is so difficult, and perhaps 
impossible, to make such characterizations with precision.316 
Further, such a system would rely heavily on a taxpayer’s 
subjective judgment. This subjectivity invites inconsistent 
application and increases opportunities for abuse or aggressive 
positions like the one taken in Renkemeyer.317 
The next-best approach is to adopt a material participation 
standard to determine whether an unincorporated business 
                                                                                                     
 313. Renkemeyer, Campbell & Weaver, LLP v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 137, 148–
49 (2011).  
 314. See Monte A. Jackel, Has Politics Trumped Policy?, 131 TAX NOTES 745, 
746 (May 16, 2011) (describing Miosi’s statements). 
 315. See id. at 746–47 (“[B]eing oral advice and not in compliance with the 
governing revenue procedure on written advice to taxpayers, [Miosi’s statement] 
is not binding on the government.”). 
 316. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing these practical 
difficulties).  
 317. See supra note 9 (describing how reliance on self-classification of 
income can lead to abuse or inconsistent designations). 
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owner’s distributive share of entity income belongs in the self-
employment tax base. A material participation standard, such as 
the one outlined in the 1997 proposed Treasury regulations,318 
provides only the “next-best” solution because it suffers from the 
same flaw that plagues the limited partner exclusion as it exists 
today: it is all or nothing.319 A distributive share is treated as 
though it is entirely a return on labor and taxed, or treated as 
though it is entirely a return on capital and excluded. In reality, 
distributive shares of entity income belonging to service-
providing partners often represent returns on both capital and 
labor.  
The limited partner exclusion in its current state creates a 
SECA tax base that underincludes income from labor in favor of 
ensuring that returns on capital are excluded. A material 
participation standard would do the opposite. Under such a 
standard, the SECA tax base would capture more labor income, 
but it would also likely capture some returns on capital. With an 
all-or-nothing standard, the question becomes one of policy: which 
flavor of income should the self-employment tax regime favor?  
To answer this question, one need only look to the historical 
foundations of the self-employment tax. Designed to complement 
the FICA payroll tax regime and implemented to fund Social 
Security—a benefit program designed to replace income from 
labor through contributions from laborers—the SECA tax regime 
has always been labor-oriented. Given the SECA tax base’s 
tendency to severely underinclude labor income,320 revising the 
limited partner exclusion standard to favor including labor 
income seems most appropriate. 
Notwithstanding its limitations, a material participation 
standard provides the soundest approach to achieving the limited 
partner exclusion’s policy goals in today’s business landscape. 
First, a material participation standard would address the salient 
                                                                                                     
 318. See supra Part V.B (describing the regulations and offering 500 hours 
per year as a threshold for “material participation”). 
 319. See Fritz, supra note 136, at 850 (explaining that the 1997 proposed 
regulations’ material participation test would “adopt an all-or-nothing 
approach,” categorizing income “without any mechanism for distinguishing 
between remuneration for services rendered and return on capital invested”). 
 320. See supra notes 117–23 and accompanying text (explaining that less 
than half of labor income is included in the SECA tax base).  
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criticisms of the current law regarding inconsistent treatment of 
similarly situated taxpayers. Such a standard would end reliance 
on state law classifications, increasing fairness and consistency at 
both the entity choice and ownership classification levels. Next, a 
material participation standard would enhance consistency with 
related provisions in the Internal Revenue Code. Lastly, such a 
standard would best align with the original policy goals behind 
the Social Security program and the exclusion’s enactment. 
A. Increasing Fairness  
A material participation standard can be applied consistently 
to all unincorporated business forms, placing owners who 
“functionally resemble” each other in relation to their entities on 
similar footing.321 As a result, prospective businesses would feel 
less pressure to select one entity form over another to obtain 
favorable self-employment tax treatment for some or all of their 
owners.322 Further, this change would eliminate the inconsistent 
treatment of owners of the same entity type who have identical 
rights but happened to register their businesses in different 
states.323 If state law labels no longer matter, then “general 
partners” and “limited partners” with equal participation levels 
will receive equal tax treatment.324  
This change could even increase fairness within a single 
business. Consider a nonparticipating investor who agreed to be 
designated a “general partner” solely to fulfill creditors’ demands 
that someone within the business have unlimited liability. The 
current standard penalizes this owner with self-employment tax 
liability but permits his co-owners—participating to the same 
extent but designated and recognized as “limited partners” by 
state law—to escape the tax. A material participation standard 
                                                                                                     
 321. Marquis, supra note 209, at 444.  
 322. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (lamenting these situations). 
 323. See Fritz, supra note 136, at 859–60 (advocating for adoption of a 
uniform standard that does not rely on state law classifications).  
 324. See Banoff, Part 1, supra note 129, at 321 (noting that if activity is the 
standard, “the labels ‘general partner’ and ‘limited partner’ become 
meaningless”). 
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would eliminate the penalty on the general partner for making 
that business-advancing choice. 
Further, a material participation standard tied to number of 
hours worked would be easier for tax practitioners and lay 
taxpayers to understand and more feasible to apply.325 This 
standard would require the same type of recordkeeping that 
many individuals already undertake to comply with passive 
activity provisions.326 Moreover, in general, such a standard 
would not require the taxpayer to make complicated legal 
judgments to comply.327 These factors enhance both the likelihood 
of compliance and the perceived fairness of the standard. 
B. Enhancing Consistency Within the Internal Revenue Code 
A material participation standard for § 1402(a)(13) would 
also align well with other relevant Code provisions such as 
§ 469328—providing passive activity loss rules329—and the new 
§ 1411330—implementing the Net Investment Income tax.331 A 
term’s meaning need not be consistent across the entire Internal 
Revenue Code; often inconsistent meanings can actually better 
serve the policy goals Congress envisioned in enacting various 
provisions.332 Consistency between the definition of “limited 
partner” in § 469 and § 1402(a)(13), however, makes sense given 
the two provisions’ similar legislative origins and policy 
objectives.333 Because § 1411 relies on the § 469 interpretation of 
                                                                                                     
 325. See id. (mentioning that a “minimum hours per year” test would be an 
“easy-to-administer, simple, bright-line test”). 
 326.  See infra Part VII.B.1 (discussing the § 469 passive activity rules and 
the provision’s material participation standard). 
 327. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)–2, 62 Fed. Reg. 1702, 1702 (Jan. 13, 
1997) (recognizing concerns about standards that depend on “legal or factual 
determinations that may be difficult for taxpayers or the IRS to make with 
certainty”). 
 328. I.R.C. § 469 (2012). 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. § 1411. 
 331. Id. 
 332. See Banoff, Part 1, supra note 129, at 326 (explaining that the IRS 
often assigns meanings provision-by-provision and noting this practice’s 
benefits). 
 333. See Stewart Karlinsky, Self-Employment Taxes and PALs: The Case of 
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“limited partner,”334 consistency between § 1402(a)(13) and § 469 
will also improve application of § 1411. 
1. Section 469 
Section 469 imposes limitations on the deductibility of losses. 
The provision and related regulations characterize activities as 
either “active” or “passive” using a material participation 
standard.335 The provision defines “material participation” as 
“involve[ment] in the operations of the activity on a basis which is 
regular, continuous, and substantial.”336  
Generally, the provision permits taxpayers to deduct passive 
activity losses only from other passive activity income.337 In 
contrast, a taxpayer may use “active” activity losses to 
immediately offset taxable income from any other source, 
including salary, wages, interest, or other capital gains.338 Losses 
disallowed under § 469 carry over to future years and may be 
deducted when passive income exists or the taxpayer disposes of 
the activity that generated the passive activity loss.339 
                                                                                                     
LLCs, 132 TAX NOTES 1391, 1392, 1394 (Sept. 26, 2011) (asserting that “much of 
the Social Security tax gap could be closed” through consistent interpretation of 
“limited partner” in § 469 and § 1402 and suggesting that the IRS could use the 
“fairly long-settled” passive activity loss regulations “to differentiate passive 
earnings from active earnings for net self-employment purposes”); see also N.Y. 
STATE BAR ASSOC. TAX SECTION, REP. 1247, COMMENTS ON THE APPLICATION OF 
EMPLOYMENT TAXES TO PARTNERS AND ON THE INTERACTION OF THE SECTION 1401 
TAX WITH THE NEW SECTION 1411 12 (2011) [hereinafter NYSBA REPORT], 
http://www.nysba.org/Content/ContentFolders20/TaxLawSection/TaxReports/12
47report.pdf (recommending adoption of a material participation standard 
“analogous to that of Section 469”). 
 334. See I.R.C. § 1411(b)(2)(A) (2012) (“A trade or business is described in 
this paragraph if such trade or business is a passive activity (within the 
meaning of section 469) with respect to the taxpayer . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
 335. See id. § 469(c)(1) (defining “passive activity” as “conduct of a trade or 
business” in which the taxpayer “does not materially participate”). 
 336. Id. § 469(h)(1)(A)–(C). 
 337. See id. § 469(a)–(c) (explaining the general passive activity loss rule). 
 338. See id. § 165 (describing the general, nonpassive loss deduction rules); 
see also Orly Sulami, Good News in a Bad Economy: Service Acquiesces on Pro-
Taxpayer Application of Passive Activity Loss Rules to Limited Liability 
Companies, 65 TAX LAW. 81, 81–82 (2011) (explaining the rule). 
 339. See I.R.C. § 469(b), (f), (g) (providing the carryover rules).  
LIMITED PARTNER EXCLUSION 2441 
Before Congress enacted these rules in 1986, taxpayers 
attempted to reduce their tax liability by investing in businesses 
that generated tax losses in excess of the investors’ economic 
outlays.340 These tax-loss-generating investments—often limited 
partnerships—served to shelter income from other sources.341 To 
eliminate these tax shelters, Congress drew a dividing line 
(similar to the one in § 1402(a)(13)) between “limited partners” 
and “general partners” by creating a presumption under 
§ 469(h)(2) that limited partners do not materially participate 
(making their income per se passive).342 In creating this 
presumption, Congress assumed that limited partners held 
limited liability and lacked the ability to participate in a 
partnership’s management—the same assumptions about limited 
partners that colored § 1402(a)(13)’s enactment.343  
General partners may satisfy the material participation 
standard through one of seven tests outlined in Temporary 
Treasury Regulation § 1.469-5T(a).344 Limited partners who do 
not also hold general partner interests may use only three of 
these tests—considered more stringent—to overcome the 
passivity presumption.345 These three tests ask whether the 
taxpayer participated in the activity for more than 500 hours 
during the taxable year;346 whether he materially participated for 
                                                                                                     
 340. See Sulami, supra note 338, at 83 (describing § 469’s history). 
 341. See id. (explaining Congress’s concern with “taxpayers’ ability to 
significantly reduce their tax liability with deductions and credits attributable 
to losses that lacked economic reality”).  
 342. I.R.C. § 469(h)(2) (2012); see also Sulami, supra note 338, at 85 
(explaining the limited partner presumption).  
 343. See Banoff, Part 1, supra note 129, at 333 (describing the role these 
assumptions played in Congress’s § 469 decision-making process); Garnett v. 
Comm’r, 132 T.C. 368, 380 (2009) (describing “the legislative belief that 
statutory constraints on a limited partner’s ability to participate in the 
partnership’s business justified a presumption that a limited partner generally 
does not materially participate”). 
 344. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a) (1996) (listing the material 
participation tests). 
 345. See Sulami, supra note 338, at 85–86 (explaining the tests and noting 
that a limited partner may not use the “more lenient material participation 
tests” available to general partners and other taxpayers). 
 346. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a)(1). 
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any five of the preceding ten taxable years;347 or whether the 
activity is a “personal service activity.”348 
The evolution of unincorporated business entities has created 
problems interpreting § 469 similar to those created in the 
context of § 1402(a)(13), especially with regard to LLCs. Without 
clear statutory or regulatory guidance, most LLC owners (and the 
IRS) have taken the position that the limited partner 
presumption applies to LLCs.349 Several recent cases, however, 
clarified that LLC ownership interests are not presumptively 
passive limited partnership interests.350 In response, the 
Treasury Department proposed regulations in 2011351 that 
remove the passivity presumption for LLC interests. These 
regulations “eliminate . . . reliance on limited liability” to 
distinguish between limited and general partners for § 469(h)(2) 
purposes, looking instead to the taxpayer’s right to participate in 
management of the entity.352 
If § 1402(a)(13) employed the material participation standard 
employed by § 469, taxpayers would lose the incentive to advance 
                                                                                                     
 347. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a)(5). 
 348. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a)(6). “Personal service activity” is 
defined as an activity that “involves the performance of personal services in (1) 
[t]he fields of health, law, engineering, architecture, accounting, actuarial 
science, performing arts, or consulting; or (2) [a]ny other trade or business in 
which capital is not a material income-producing factor.” Temp. Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.469-5T(d). 
 349. See Sulami, supra note 338, at 86–88 (describing early applications of 
§ 469 to LLCs).  
 350. See Newell v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1107, at *5–6 (2010) (holding 
that a managing LLC member functioned as the “substantial equivalent” of a 
general partner, making it inappropriate to apply the limited partner passivity 
presumption); Garnett v. Comm’r, 132 T.C. 368, 380 (2009) (concluding that 
LLC and LLP interest owners may use the seven material participation tests 
available to “general partners” for passive activity loss purposes and refusing to 
use an owner’s limited liability as a determinative factor); Thompson v. United 
States, 87 Fed. Cl. 728, 734–39 (2009) (reading § 469(h)(2) literally to conclude 
that the passive presumption applies only to taxpayers recognized by state law 
as limited partners).  
 351. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5(e)(3)(i), 76 Fed. Reg. 72,875 (Nov. 28, 2011). 
 352. See id. at 72,877 (“Recognizing that the original presumptions 
regarding [a limited partner’s participation] are no longer valid . . . and . . . 
recognizing the emergence of LLCs, the proposed regulations eliminate the 
current regulations’ reliance on limited liability . . . and instead adopt an 
approach that relies on [a] partner’s right to participate in the 
management . . . .”). 
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a literal interpretation of § 469 (that is, that the heightened 
participation standards imposed on limited partners are applied 
only to taxpayers who are limited partners in a state law limited 
partnership) while at the same time advancing a nonliteral, 
functional interpretation of § 1402(a)(13) (that is, that the limited 
partner exclusion should extend beyond those having the formal 
title of limited partner to any owner who has limited liability 
under state law).353 If the IRS finalizes the § 469 proposed 
regulations without issuing corresponding interpretive guidance 
for § 1402(a)(13), an LLC member could easily have “the best of 
both worlds”—the ability to deduct LLC losses against 
nonpassive income under the passive activity loss rules and avoid 
self-employment taxes through the limited partner exclusion.354 
As Orly Sulami notes, “[t]his ability of investors to inconsistently 
apply and benefit from the definition of ‘limited partner’ comes at 
the expense of the Treasury Department.”355 Sulami also argues 
that the IRS, “aware of the detrimental effects of recent case law” 
issued the proposed passive loss regulations to “help mitigate this 
dichotomy.”356 
2. Section 1411 
The material participation standard would also dovetail 
nicely with the new Affordable Care Act taxes. As Part II.C 
explains, § 1411 imposes the NII tax on income from “passive” 
activities, as defined under § 469. Consistency between § 469 and 
§ 1402 would enable taxpayers to better identify income subject 
to the NII and nonpassive income instead subject to the Medicare 
surtax. A consistent standard would also prevent taxpayers from 
calling income “active” to avoid the NII tax but “limited partner-
like” to avoid the self-employment tax.357 As Keatinge notes, 
                                                                                                     
 353. See Karlinsky, supra note 333, at 1392 (asking whether “what’s good for 
the goose (the taxpayer avoiding Section 469)” is “also good for the gander (the 
taxpayer subject to the self-employment tax under Section 1402)”). 
 354. Sulami, supra note 338, at 106–07.  
 355. Id. at 107. 
 356. Id. 
 357. See NYSBA REPORT, supra note 333, at 21 (arguing that a material 
participation standard “would generally require taxpayers to take consistent tax 
positions with respect to Section 1402, the passive loss rules of Section 469, and 
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current limited partner exclusion law would allow a limited 
partner who actively participates in a business but has no wages 
or net earnings from self-employment to avoid the Affordable 
Care Act taxes.358 
C. Supporting the Self-Employment Tax Regime’s Original Goals 
Most important, a material participation standard best 
aligns with Social Security’s founding policy premises. 
Specifically, a material participation standard will promote 
universal participation and will further Congress’s desire to 
impose self-employment taxes on labor income.  
As Part II.A explains, Social Security’s framers knew the 
program would not generate enough revenue to meet its future 
obligations unless all workers participated. While the framers 
analogized the program to a pension to increase popular support, 
they founded Social Security on the belief that the nation as a 
whole had a duty to create some measure of economic security for 
its citizens.359 Universal participation in Social Security—and 
universal participation in its financing system—thus serves both 
practical and ideological ends.360 Section 1402(a)(13)’s current 
structure permits some taxpayers to opt out of the self-
employment tax regime through entity choice—an option that is 
inconsistent with the system’s universal participation goal. A 
material participation standard, however, would promote this 
historical objective by eliminating opportunities for 
unincorporated business owners to make such an election. 
Next, a material participation standard would promote the 
policy goal of funding Social Security through taxes on labor 
                                                                                                     
the new Section 1411 Tax”).  
 358. See KEATINGE, supra note 273, at 19 (positing this scenario).  
 359. See President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to the Congress 
Reviewing the Broad Objectives and Accomplishments of the Administration 
(June 8, 1934), in 3 PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 
287, 288 (1938) (“We are compelled to employ the active interest of the Nation 
as a whole through government in order to encourage a greater security for each 
individual who composes it.”). 
 360. See JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 215 (1983) (describing 
how universal participation eliminates the incentive for a worker to shift 
occupations to avoid paying employment or self-employment taxes). 
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income. When Congress enacted § 1402(a)(13), it stated that it 
wanted to exclude earnings that were basically “of an investment 
nature” from the self-employment tax base.361 Congress used 
limited partners’ limited liability and limited participation as 
signs of “investment” income. Because those signs no longer 
accurately point to investment income, new indicators are needed 
to identify investment income.  
Considering that limited liability is a policy choice, designed 
to promote investment,362 a person’s limited liability says nothing 
about whether income from the associated activity is an 
investment. Thus, limited liability should not be the new “signal.” 
 A person’s participation in managerial decisions, however, 
can transform passive “investments” into active ventures. 
Participation, like labor, connotes activity, not passivity.363 If 
limited partners in 1977 participated in management to the 
extent that limited partners in 2013 may participate, it is 
doubtful that Congress would have used limited partnership 
status as a labor–capital dividing line. By reframing the 
interpretive standard to focus solely on participation, the self-
employment tax base can better fulfill Congress’s original intent 
to include labor income in the SECA tax base and exclude 
“investment” income.  
D. Criticisms of a Material Participation Standard 
As stated, those who reject a material participation standard 
because it lacks a mechanism for a materially participating 
owner to exclude a portion of his earnings as return on capital 
present a valid concern. Critics of the material participation 
standard suggest that a partner’s distributive share of entity 
income always represents a return on invested capital.364  
                                                                                                     
 361. H. R. REP. NO. 95-702(I), at 11 (1977). 
 362. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and 
the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 90–97 (1985) (noting that “[l]imited 
liability . . . has long been explained as a benefit bestowed on investors by the 
state” and explaining how limited liability encourages investment). 
 363. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1229 (9th ed. 2009) (defining 
“participation” as the “act of taking part in something”) (emphasis added). 
 364. See Fritz, supra note 136, at 850–51 (equating distributive shares of 
partnership income with returns on capital).  
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But this claim discounts that capital investments in 
unincorporated businesses do not generate financial returns in a 
vacuum. When a business owner adds labor to capital to generate 
income, at least a portion of that income is a return on labor.365 
Capital investments—such as buying a building to house a new 
store or purchasing a piece of manufacturing equipment to add a 
product line—obviously generate returns by increasing a 
business’s value. But labor turns the building into a profit-
generating store or calibrates that equipment to manufacture the 
new product. If a business owner paid an employee to set up a 
new store or set up that machinery, the FICA tax regime would 
capture the employee’s income and impose employment taxes.  
Under the current interpretation of the limited partner 
exclusion, a business owner could perform the identical labor as 
that employee, refuse all guaranteed payments for those services, 
and keep her return on that labor out of the SECA tax base. This 
inconsistent result contributes to the porous nature of the self-
employment tax base.366 The only way to address these “leaks” is 
to adopt a standard that is more inclusive of labor income, even if 
it means increasing the likelihood that some returns on capital 
will be subject to SECA taxes. Given Congress’s willingness to 
subject returns on capital to an income tax of a percentage equal 
to the Medicare tax through the new NII tax,367 a system that is 
slightly overinclusive of capital should not cause great concern.  
VIII. Conclusion 
Recognizing its limitations, a material participation standard 
provides the soundest and most feasible approach to achieving 
the limited partner exclusion’s policy goals in today’s business 
landscape. The question remains, however, as to who should 
                                                                                                     
 365. See supra Part III (explaining how the landscape business owner 
combines his labor with capital investments to generate income); see also JOINT 
COMM. ON TAXATION, ADDITIONAL OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE 33–34 
(Aug. 3, 2006) (“[L]abor income is also earned by employee-owners of 
passthrough entities conducting capital-intensive businesses.”).  
 366. See supra notes 117–23 and accompanying text (noting that the current 
SECA tax base captures less than 50% of labor income).  
 367. See supra notes 101–06 and accompanying text (describing the 3.8% net 
investment income tax and its application to returns on capital). 
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adopt the standard and how it should be adopted. Perhaps the 
simplest solution would be for the Treasury Department to 
initiate the rulemaking process for regulations similar to the ones 
proposed in 1997. But, given Congress’s response to the 1997 
regulations, especially the Senate resolution expressing concern 
that the Treasury had “exceeded its authority,” the Treasury 
Department is unlikely to issue regulations without congressional 
prompting. 
A better solution would be for Congress to incorporate the 
material participation standard in the statute by eliminating the 
reference to “limited partner” and replacing it with participation-
focused language. This solution, however, would likely evoke the 
same backlash from the business community that doomed the 
1997 regulations. That backlash, coupled with the difficulty of 
enacting any revenue increase in today’s political climate, makes 
congressional action less likely. Moreover, the fact that Congress 
has known about the lost self-employment revenue since the mid-
1990s but has not acted to address the problem might 
demonstrate that Congress is comfortable with lax enforcement of 
the provision. 
Ad hoc judicial interpretation offers the final means to adopt 
a material participation standard. The Tax Court’s laudable 
decision in Renkemeyer has created an opportunity for other 
courts to reject reliance on state law classifications and interpret 
the limited partner exclusion to serve the provision’s original 
policy goal. Changing the law through case-by-case judicial 
interpretation will not provide taxpayers with guidance as 
efficiently or effectively as a legislative resolution, but it may be 
the only feasible way to achieve change in this area. 
  
